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 I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States armed forces’ personnel system is unique among large 
organizations.  A limited-entry system, personnel are promoted only from within and 
recruits from outside the organization enter at the lowest level.  Such a structure allows 
for large turnover at the junior ranks, but it presents a challenge for manpower experts 
who must retain the more senior members who possess skills and leadership traits 
necessary to complete the military missions.  The nature of these missions complicates 
the challenge.  Often requiring members to be separated from their family and friends for 
long deployments in less than ideal living conditions and to work long hours in strenuous 
environments, these missions impose both a physical and mental cost on the members. 
When deciding to remain in the military, a member must measure the magnitude 
of this cost and weigh it against the benefits received from serving.  The difference in the 
costs and benefits is the value the member assigns to his or her service.  The member then 
performs an analysis of the perceived costs and benefits of alternative employment 
opportunities and assigns each alternative a value.  If the value of serving is greater than 
the alternatives, the member remains in the service; if not, the member separates.  It has 
been suggested that the flat structure of the basic military pay system, with its relatively 
small increase in salary between pay grades, impedes the services’ ability to create a 
competitive cost-benefit ratio.  As a result, the services, and the Navy in particular, resort 
to various monetary and non-pecuniary benefits in the form of special pays, bonuses, and 
quality-of-life initiatives to create a better value proposition for members deciding 
whether to stay in the service.  In the Navy, many of the key missions involve sea duty; 
the additional benefit offered to compensate for it and encourage it is Career Sea Pay 
(CSP) and Career Sea Pay Premium (CSPP).   While CSP and CSPP exist in both the 
officer and the enlisted ranks, this project focused its scope on the enlisted community 
(which accounts for most of the CSP and CSPP expenditures).   
The Navy has offered sea pay in one variety or another for almost as long as the 
institution has been in existence.  Regardless of the manner in which the sea pay program 
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has been structured, its goal has been to recompense Sailors for hardships experienced at 
sea.  Initially, CSP was funded by reducing the basic pay of Sailors’ when they took a 
shore assignment; now, the pay is an additional remuneration structured similar to base 
pay.  CSP was initiated in the early 1980’s, and since that time it has been increased only 
twice.  Until late 2001, CSP was offered while the Navy was primarily conducting 
peacetime operations.  For Sailors, this period meant regular deployments that could be 
planned for with the guarantee of port calls that allowed for a break from the rigors of life 
at sea.  Such circumstances reduced the perceived cost of sea duty.  For Navy financial 
managers, the relatively small size of the CSP program when compared to other 
personnel pays gave them little cause to consider if the program was cost-effective.  With 
the defense buildup in the Cold War 1980’s and the manpower reduction instated as part 
of the “peace dividend” of the 1990’s, CSP was not an important issue. 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent Global War on 
Terrorism forced all programs under the microscope.  The increasing frequency and 
irregularity of deployments to combat theaters of operation coincided with an effort by 
the Navy to make the service more sea-centric.  The opportunities for active duty Sailors 
to serve in shore assignments decreased as those jobs were converted to civilian positions 
in an attempt to reduce personnel costs.  These simultaneous events present a potential 
difficulty for long-term willingness to perform sea duty and remain in the Navy as they 
increase the cost of service faced by individual members. 
Knowing that the benefits of a public policy program should outweigh its cost, 
financial managers at the Office of Financial Management and Budget in the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) expressed 
concern about the effectiveness of the CSP program.  With an increase in the CSP rates 
enacted just prior to September 11, 2001, has the extra cost of CSP adequately 
compensated for the changes in sea duty associated with the Global War on Terrorism 
and met the needs of the force? 
In the following chapters, this project’s authors endeavor to answer that question.  
Chapter II provides a context for the CSP program as a part of the overall military 
compensation system.  It first examines the advantages and disadvantages of the general 
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military compensation system’s structure to provide incentive necessary to adequately 
man the force.  The chapter then explores the efficacy of compensating wages such as 
CSP in influencing retention decisions.  Next, previous studies relating specifically to 
CSP are reviewed.  Finally, the history of the CSP program is presented to demonstrate 
the original intent of the program and the methods implemented to accomplish those 
goals. 
Chapter III presents data available to measure both the costs the Navy incurs to 
keep people at sea and the benefits obtained.  These data focus on a representative sample 
by using individuals from five Navy ratings.  These ratings vary both in skill level 
required and the amount of time during a career typically spent at sea.  Three ratings are 
considered sea-intensive: Boatswain Mate (BM), Fire Controlman (FC), and Operations 
Specialist (OS).  Two are considered shore-intensive: Cryptologic Technician Interpretive 
(CTI) and Master-at Arms (MA). 
Chapter IV explains the methodology employed to conduct empirical and 
statistical assessments of the cost-effectiveness of the CSP program.  Chapter V presents 
the results of that analysis.  Chapter VI communicates the conclusions drawn from the 
results and analysis and provides recommendations to the Navy for improving the 
effectiveness of the CSP program as an incentive to willingly perform sea duty. 
 4
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The value of CSP as a contributor to overall military compensation has been 
studied intermittently since the program was formally codified by Congress in 1978.  
While statutorily classified as a special pay to compensate for the arduous nature of sea 
duty, it has also been described as a necessary force-shaping tool (Golding & McArver, 
2002).  Because of this dual nature, it is important to understand CSP in both contexts.  
Hence, this chapter will first examine four major areas: (a) theoretical analyses of the 
military compensation system, (b) theoretical and empirical studies on the presence and 
efficacy of compensating wage differentials, (c) retention models and factors that affect 
retention, and (d) empirical and behavioral studies on sea pay and its relationship to sea 
duty and retention.  This broad review is necessary because of the unique nature of the 
military compensation system.  
 This chapter will conclude with a discussion of recent sea-shore rotation policy 
revisions and a review of the history behind the CSP program. Changes in sea-shore 
rotation directly impact the amount of sea duty enlisted personnel will perform over their 
career, which increases the importance of determining the effectiveness of CSP.  
Examining the history of CSP reveals both the underlying justifications for establishing 
the program and how it has evolved over the past 170 years.  Appendix A provides a 
legislative history of the CSP program.  
B.  THE MILITARY COMPENSATION SYSTEM 
The military compensation system is unique among large, hierarchical 
organizations.  Asch and Warner (2001) note three specific features – the relatively small 
difference in pay between ranks, a pension available only after a predetermined time of 
service, and the requirement to leave the organization if not promoted – that differ from 
the compensation plan of most large civilian companies.  The latter characteristic also 
differentiates the military from federal civil service.  Rosen (1992, p. 236) suggests that 
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these features make the compensation system “better suited to armed services based on 
conscription and tradition rather than on the voluntary professional army we have at 
present.”  This conclusion is a result of the allocation, productivity, and incentive 
problems that such a system can create for personnel and finance managers in the 
military.   
Under conscription, wages were less important as an allocation tool since 
personnel could be easily replaced.  Janowitz (1960) points out that special pays were 
determined by custom and tradition more than by a need to retain personnel in certain 
critical activities (as cited in Rosen, 1992).  The resulting wage compression promoted 
more teamwork and therefore more productivity, and many believe that this is still a valid 
principle (Rosen, 1992).  While this may be true, wage compression does not effectively 
promote reenlistment.  Numerous studies, both theoretical and empirical, have shown that 
future income promotes reenlistment since wage elasticity of supply in the military is 
greater than unity; thus the percentage change in quantity of labor supplied is greater than 
the percentage change in wages provided by advancement (Warner & Goldberg, 1984; 
Daula & Moffitt, 1995; Griffis & Golding, 1997).  Consequently, bonuses, special pays, 
and incentive pays in the military are used increasingly to overcome the problems the 
basic pay structure presents.  CSP is a special pay the military uses to augment basic pay 
for those performing sea duty.  This pay should serve some benefit in allocating 
personnel; however, since it is structured like basic pay with increases due to rank and 
years of service at sea, Rosen’s analysis suggests that it may not be effective unless there 
is significant skewing of wages between pay levels. 
Skewed wages at different levels of rank are also important in hierarchical 
organizations such as the military because influence increases with rank.  At each 
successive level, the span of control and responsibility increases significantly (Rosen, 
1992).  The implication is that it is economically optimal to assign those with the most 
ability to top positions (Asch & Warner, 2001).  The increasing marginal product of good 
performance at each rank indicates that the marginal wage at each rank should similarly 
increase (Rosen, 1992; Asch & Warner, 2001). 
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Since the military is perhaps the largest hierarchical organization in the United 
States and the span of control at upper levels is therefore larger, the pay scale would be 
expected to be more skewed than that in a civilian organization, but it is not.  Bureaucrats 
and legislators seeking to change any part of the compensation system, including CSP, 
must be aware of the flat nature of the military pay scale.  To the extent that changing the 
structure of CSP increases the difference in pay between ranks, CSP serves to better 
reward the increase in productivity generated by those serving competently in the higher 
ranks.  Conversely, changes that lessen the skew in wages or create an inversion impair 
ability to retain and promote the most talented personnel and decrease the productivity of 
the entire force.   
Compensation structure also plays a primary role in determining the shape of the 
military force.  Any person deciding whether or not to remain in the service considers 
costs and benefits.  The benefit to remaining is primarily the income that person can 
expect to receive (both while in the service and after retirement), although other benefits 
are also present, e. g. free health care and intangibles such as power and status (Rosen, 
1992).  Part of this expected income consists of the increase in wages that results from a 
promotion.  Given that there is no lateral entry into the military structure and promotions 
occur from within, receiving one promotion makes a person eligible for others (Rosen, 
1992; Asch & Warner, 2001).  Since there are fewer available positions at each 
successive level in the hierarchy, a competition ensues and promotion opportunity 
decreases at each level (Rosen, 1992).  Those desiring to pursue a career must increase 
their effort to remain competitive for promotions since the quality of personnel 
presumably rises at each level.   
The benefit calculation to encourage this effort is the weighted sum of all rewards 
obtained at all future potential ranks, with the weights being the probability of promotion 
(Rosen, 1992).  Rosen therefore determines that the proportional increase in salary at 
each rank level must be greater than the proportional decrease in promotion probability to 
ensure the process remains competitive and retains the correct personnel.  He also 
concludes that the military pay structure remains flat despite this determination; a large 
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rank difference in salary can produce lack of cohesiveness and cooperation detrimental to 
the successful operation of the organization (Rosen, 1992).   
Asch and Warner (2001) develop a model to explain military compensation policy 
by measuring effort, ability, wages, promotion probability, and preference for serving.  
They confirm Rosen’s analysis that increasing the skew of the pay system improves these 
variables, but not significantly.  They offer three reasons that facilitate the military in 
maintaining a flat pay structure between ranks: lateral entry requires a higher initial 
starting salary to attract recruits, the force structure is bottom heavy allowing for more 
turnover in the junior ranks, and a heterogeneity of preferences that promotes more 
sorting on preferences and increased retention at higher ranks (Asch & Warner, 2001).  
From this analysis, it appears that skewing wages for junior personnel may increase their 
retention since sorting based on preferences has yet to occur.  The pay scale can flatten as 
seniority increases since the value of the military pension becomes a more significant 
factor in whether to remain in the military.   
Career Sea Pay is a part of the overall military compensation system.  The studies 
above focus on compensation as a means to encourage effort and productivity, otherwise 
known as an efficiency wage. However, CSP is often regarded as a compensating wage 
since it is designed to provide a monetary reward for performing arduous duty (Rosen, 
1992; Fairris & Alston, 1994; Asch & Warner, 2001).  The following section discusses 
compensating wages and their relationship to efficiency wages. 
C.  COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIALS 
1.  Theory 
Adam Smith wrote that the “agreeableness or disagreeableness of the 
employments themselves” is one of five principles that explain monetary wage 
differences between jobs (1793/1981, p. 116).  Disagreeable jobs must command higher 
wages to offset the disadvantages inherent in the nature of the work.  Otherwise, 
economic equilibrium in the labor market would never be established as no one would be 
willing to perform the disagreeable task without a differential wage.  Compensating 
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wages are present in labor markets to equalize overall compensation among identical 
workers with diverse work environments (Fairris & Alston, 1994).  This theory of 
compensating wages, proposed over 200 years ago, has not been tested empirically until 
recently.  These studies attempt to identify if compensating wages are actually paid and if 
so, for what job characteristics. 
2. Empirical Evidence 
While the theory of compensating wage differentials has been generally accepted 
and further developed since the time of Adam Smith, there have been difficulties in 
applying the theory in real-world settings.  Robert Smith (1979) notes that labor markets 
and their relevant supply and demand curves are made up of many dimensions.  It is 
therefore problematic to analyze single characteristics such as the unpleasantness of the 
work to be performed.  Thus, “the fact that [researchers] cannot in general estimate 
underlying demand or supply functions for job characteristics limits the usefulness of 
compensating differentials for policy purposes” (R. Smith, 1979, 341).  Fairris and Alston 
(1994, p. 149) amplify that concern, and state that the “distinction between efficiency 
wages and compensating payments is, at best, rather vague in…literatures positing a 
relationship between wages and the intensity of labor effort.”  They conclude that 
determining this relationship requires developing a model that distinguishes between the 
two types of compensation and simultaneously measures the presence of each (Fairris & 
Alston, 1994).  Using such a model and survey data from the 1977 Quality of 
Employment Survey, they conclude that compensating wage differentials are not received 
by workers who perform more strenuous work; instead, any pay differences are 
efficiency wages (Fairris & Alston, 1994). 
The above result suggests that if compensating payments are not present, they are 
not required by potential employees.  If true, this would have a profound impact on the 
use of special pays such as CSP that are designed to provide compensating differentials.  
The result is similar to those of many studies performed in the 1970s exploring the 
presence and extent of compensating differentials for various job characteristics.  A 
review of over 15 studies indicates the only negative job characteristic for which 
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employers provide a significantly positive compensating wage is risk of death (R. Smith, 
1979).  The presence of other negative characteristics such as job insecurity and hard or 
stressful work provides no clear support for compensating wage differential theory (R. 
Smith, 1979).  Robert Smith (1979) believes that each of the studies has some deficiency 
such as the type of data analyzed or the model utilized.  For example, self-reported data 
(such as those used by Fairris and Alston (1994)) may exhibit selection biases due to the 
background and level of risk aversion of the respondents (R. Smith, 1979).   
The results of these studies indicate that attempting to determine wages required 
to compensate for the negative aspects of sea duty can be difficult.  Yet, one negative 
aspect of sea duty may be easy to measure: hours worked.  The Chief of Naval 
Operations (2002) acknowledged that there is an expectation that personnel at sea will 
work longer hours.  As defined by the Navy Standard Workweek, Sailors are nominally 
expected to work 81 hours per week while underway, of which 70 (exclusive of time for 
training and administrative requirements) are productive (Chief of Naval Operations, 
2002).  Surveys conducted that asked Sailors to report their hours worked while 
underway have shown that these numbers are fairly accurate (Golding et al., 2001).   
This places Navy personnel at sea in a position experienced by only a small 
percentage of their civilian counterparts.  Table 1 shows the percentage of the civilian 
employed workforce who reported working either 40 hours or less per week or more than 
60 hours per week as derived from the December 2006 Current Population Survey 
conducted by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Clearly, Navy personnel are 
expected to work much more when at sea than similarly qualified civilians.  The likely 
fatigue induced by this longer workweek is magnified by the impact of rotating watches 
and the requirement to respond to unannounced drills or casualties.  Golding et al. (2001) 
found that those sailors who reported working more than 70 hours per week are 10 
percent more likely to be lost by attrition during their sea tour than those who report 
working less than 70 hours per week.   
In port, the Chief of Naval Operations (2002) expected Sailors to work a standard 
40-hour week, of which 33.38 hours (exclusive of training, administrative requirements, 
leave, and holidays) are productive.  Thus, by using Navy Standard Workweek values, it 
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should be feasible to measure the effectiveness of CSP based on an ability to compensate 
for the additional hours worked at sea.  For more intangible factors, however, the 
effectiveness of CSP may be better measured by examining its effect on retention.  The 
following section examines some of the major factors affecting retention and the models 
used to explain them. 
 
Percentage 
Hours of Work Males Females 
40 or Less 62.69% 79.15% 
60 or Greater 11.90% 4.25% 
 
Table 1.   Typical Hours of Work in a Week, Civilian Sector. (From United States 
Census Bureau, 2006) 
 
D. RETENTION MODELS AND FACTORS AFFECTING RETENTION 
1. Retention Models 
When a person decides whether to reenlist there are a number of factors that the 
individual considers.  These factors include future wages, marriage status, geographic 
location, age, education, race, and time at sea (Warner & Goldberg, 1984; Brown, 1985; 
Schiller et al., 1991; Rosen, 1992; Asch & Warner, 2001; Carrell & West, 2005; Huang 
et al., 2006).  The likelihood of earning more money by leaving the military is a key 
determinant in any retention decision.  Accurately calculating the true value of this 
opportunity cost by predicting the effects of the factors above has been an ongoing 
challenge for economists. The calculation process is such that if the “present value of the 
returns associated with [leaving] exceeds both the monetary and psychological costs of 
leaving, workers will be motivated to change jobs” (Huang et al., 2006, p. 492).  
Psychological costs include non-pecuniary aspects of leaving such as the stress an 
individual may experience while searching for a new job and transitioning to a new work 
environment.  
Warner and Goldberg (1984) propose the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) 
model for reenlistment decisions.  This model has come to be the “most well-known 
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model in the military retention literature” (Daula & Moffitt, 1995, p. 507).  In this model, 
the cost of leaving is the difference between the present value of the income stream 
staying in n more years and then leaving and the income stream from leaving 
immediately; therefore, an “individual prefers a strategy of remaining in the military for n 
more years to one of leaving immediately only if the ACOL exceeds the net taste for 
civilian life” (Warner & Goldberg, 1984, p. 27).  The model’s strengths are that it 
determines the optimal value for the ACOL that is used for comparison to the net 
preference for civilian life and it is relatively simple to calculate (Daula & Moffitt, 1995).  
However, Daula & Moffitt assert that the model is weak because it does not account for 
changes in the future leaving date and assumes that individuals ignore the possibility of 
future changes in compensation (no error factor). 
To alleviate these concerns, Daula and Moffitt (1995) proposed a new retention 
model based on dynamic programming.  While specific discussion of the model’s 
formulation is beyond the scope of this review, the salient difference between this model 
and the ACOL model is incorporation of heterogeneous preferences.  This heterogeneity 
was noted by Asch and Warner (2001) above as a reason for the flatness of the 
compensation structure of the military.  Daula and Moffitt (1995, p. 505) account for the 
heterogeneity by “introducing a conventional random effect that differs across individuals 
but which is constant over time.”  Despite this criticism of the ACOL model, Daula and 
Moffitt (1995) concede that the ACOL and their model produce similar results when 
immediate changes in compensation occur.  However, when changes in compensation to 
be made in the future are incorporated to model current reenlistment decisions, they 
conclude their model yields more plausible predictions (Daula & Moffit, 1995). 
Goldberg (2001) performs a thorough analysis of both models.  While 
acknowledging the ACOL model’s use of a single, dominant horizon, Goldberg (2001) 
points out that the model’s creators always intended that the model be recalculated for 
any change in future compensation.  Additionally, the assertion made by Daula and 
Moffitt (1995) that their model does not take significantly longer to generate results than 
the ACOL model is shown to be false.  One model run takes, by the creators’ admission, 
over 48 hours of computer time (Goldberg, 2001).  Therefore, the arguments made by 
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Daula and Moffitt (1995) do not invalidate the ACOL model; rather the term “optimal 
horizon” should not be used to describe the future period used by the ACOL model to 
derive its results (Goldberg, 2001, p. 76).  
Each of the above (and similar) models incorporate the non-pecuniary factors 
mentioned above and measure their effect on retention. The remainder of this section 
discusses three other factors that CSP can possibly influence as an individual makes a 
decision to remain in the military: future earnings, marriage status, and geographic 
location. Studies on sea duty effects and CSP will be considered in the next section. 
2. Future Civilian Earnings 
The most difficult factors to value are non-pecuniary. Salary values are readily 
available. As discussed above, numerous studies find that the military-civilian pay 
difference has a significant impact on retention since the military pay elasticity is greater 
than unity (Warner & Goldberg, 1984; Daula & Moffitt, 1995; Asch & Warner, 2001).  
These results are similar to studies done in civilian organizations that found longer 
retention when pay is higher than that offered externally or when pay is higher than that 
of their peers (Huang et al., 2006).  While the latter scenario is rare in the military, the 
former scenario provides evidence that military members act similarly to their civilian 
counterparts.   
One study finds that wages offered in the civilian sector, or opportunity wages, 
have come to have a reduced effect on the reenlistment decision (Schiller et al., 1991).  
Using longitudinal data tracking the post-military employment history of Navy veterans, 
the study determines that opportunity wages do not have a significant impact on retention 
(Schiller et al., 1991).  Rather than disprove the theory supported by the evidence above, 
they believe that it supports it.  They conclude that the Navy effectively uses reenlistment 
bonuses to minimize the military-civilian wage differential (Schiller et al., 1991).  Based 
on these results, one would expect any increase in military compensation to have a 
positive effect on retention; however, since the amount of CSP compared to overall 
compensation is small, it is likely that retirement benefits and bonuses are more effective 
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at overcoming differentials with civilian pay.  Hence, a more narrow focus on the direct 
effect of CSP on sea duty is likely a more useful plan of study.         
3. Marital Status 
Marital status is another factor that is often studied in relation to retention.  Unlike 
military-civilian wage differences, however, the results are mixed.  A number of studies 
conclude that married military personnel reenlist at higher rates than their single peers 
because of the lure of non-pecuniary benefits including health care and access to 
commissaries (Warner & Goldberg, 1984; Daula & Moffitt, 1995).  These conclusions 
are similar to studies done in the civilian sector that show marriage to be significantly and 
positively related to retention length (Huang et al., 2006).  Conversely, a study using 
longitudinal data found that married personnel are less inclined to reenlist in the Navy, 
presumably because of long absences while at sea (Schiller et al., 1991). 
The conflicting findings present an issue of interest for those studying the 
effectiveness of CSP.  If separation from family while at sea is a factor that should be 
compensated for, should CSP have different pay tables for those with and without 
dependents like the Basic Allowance for Housing?  Are non-pecuniary benefits enough to 
encourage retention?  Williams (2006) argues that cash payments are more tangible and 
allow members to better evaluate and compare their total compensation with civilian pay.    
4. Geography 
The relationship between geographic location and reenlistment does not 
intuitively appear to be significant. But recent studies find it is a concern when 
considering military compensation in general, and CSP, specifically.  The impact of 
geography on enlistment decisions has been studied for some time.  Brown (1985) 
suggests that the decision to enlist will vary by region due to both a cultural propensity 
for military service in some areas and a non-uniform unemployment rate throughout the 
country.  He finds that the ratio of military to civilian pay by state to be a significant 
factor in explaining military enlistments by state (Brown, 1985).  If high unemployment 
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rates encourage enlistment, some posit that bases located in high demand or high cost 
locations will have lower reenlistment rates.   
Carrell and West (2005) state that the military compensation system is inefficient 
because it does not vary basic pay based on the geographic location where a member is 
stationed like most civilian organizations.  Consequently, the military-civilian pay ratio in 
those areas is reduced, and retention lowers at those bases since the preference for the 
military in favor of civilian life is not compensated as well.  To correct this, they suggest 
modifying the wage system so that there are exactly enough volunteers for each location 
(Carrell & West, 2005).  While they prefer changes to the basic pay tables to achieve 
their objective, they acknowledge that auction systems such as the Navy’s Assignment 
Incentive Pay (AIP) Program have been effective at efficiently and effectively sorting 
personnel at low-demand duty stations (Carrell & West, 2005). 
Bub (2005) separately applies the logic of Carrell and West (2005) to sea duty 
assignment locations.  Throughout the Navy, there are billets at a number of duty stations 
that are difficult to fill voluntarily because of amenities or location (Bub, 2005).  The 
effect of involuntary assignment is a reduction in retention and an increase in retention 
bonuses required to maintain force levels at those locations.  Noting the success of the 
AIP program, Bub (2005) proposes allowing Navy enlisted personnel to bid on their CSP 
rate so that every billet is voluntarily filled.  This plan would increase the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the CSP program, generating millions of dollars in savings from 
unneeded retention bonuses to maintain manning levels for billets involuntarily assigned 
in the current system (Bub, 2005).  The next section reviews those studies that investigate 
the effect of CSP changes on retention and willingness to go to sea. 
E. SEA PAY STUDIES 
1. Early Studies 
Numerous studies that examine the effects of sea pay on retention through 
reenlistment or extension were conducted in the first half of the 1980s.  They studies also 
investigate the relationship between sea duty and sea pay.  Solnick (1988, p. 2) notes that 
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“sea duty is an effect that cannot be divorced from any study on the impacts of sea pay.”  
Kleinman (1983) concludes that changes in sea pay have a positive correlation with sea 
duty changes but have less impact on total man-years served than using reenlistment 
bonuses (as cited in Solnick, 1988).  This is because sea duty has a negative effect on 
reenlistments while sea pay encourages extensions (Solnick, 1988). Warner and Goldberg 
(1984), in their paper that derives the ACOL model, use the model to test their hypothesis 
that the incidence of sea duty has an inverse effect on retention rates.  Their analysis 
shows that those specialties with a higher incidence of sea duty have lower wage 
elasticities and reenlist at lower rates at the first decision point than those specialties with 
lower sea duty rates (Warner & Goldberg, 1984).  Additional studies by Radke (1984) 
and Goldberg (1985) suggest that increasing sea pay may increase extensions at the 
expense of reenlistments (as cited in Solnick, 1988). 
In a thorough analysis of these early studies, Solnick (1988) finds that researchers 
did include sea duty in their attempt to find the effect of sea pay; however, data 
limitations and modeling choices provide inconsistent results that often lack statistical 
significance.  While he identifies seven conditions that must exist to effectively 
determine the effect of sea pay on reenlistments and extensions, only three are of interest 
in our research.  First, the interaction between reenlistments and extensions must be 
considered jointly and sea pay must be allowed to have different effects on each (Solnick, 
1988).  In many studies, the decision is modeled simply as stay-or-go, with no attempt to 
model an extend-reenlist type decision.  This ignores the relationship between extending 
and reenlisting.  If those who extend are more likely to reenlist and if sea pay encourages 
more extensions, one could conclude that sea pay also has a positive effect on 
reenlistments (Solnick, 1988).  Goldberg (2001) cites this limitation and concludes that it 
still exists thirteen years later as models that can accurately account for this possibility 
are still unwieldy and rarely used.   
The second issue that Solnick (1988) identifies is considering the effect of sea pay 
on sea duty independent of retention effects.  That analysis would determine if sea pay is 
encouraging additional sea duty by compensating for its unpleasant aspects.  Studies of 
this type have been performed recently and are discussed below.  The final issue is self-
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selection into sea-intensive ratings that lead to biases in data if personal taste for sea duty 
is ignored when grouping data by occupational area (Solnick, 1988).  Thus, the effect of 
sea pay on retention will likely differ among occupational groups (Solnick, 1988).  To 
account for this bias, aggregation of data should be minimized whenever possible and 
individual responses from sources such as the annual Quality of Life Survey should be 
used (Solnick, 1988).  To avoid these concerns and address these issues, most of the 
recent studies on CSP and its effects have been behavioral and use less modeling.     
2.  Recent Studies 
The study of sea pay and its effects on sea duty and retention did not reemerge as 
a significant topic until the late 1990s.  The Navy was reducing end strength and 
converting military-filled shore billets to civilian-filled billets while maintaining the same 
fleet, requiring the sea-shore rotation ratio to increase.  An increase in the sea-shore 
rotation ratio leads to an increase in sea duty and a decrease in retention.  The attempt by 
Navy leadership to address these concerns is described below.  Griffis and Golding 
(1997) find that a reduction in 5,000 shore billets decreases Zone ‘A’ retention by 1 
percent and Zone ‘B’ retention by 0.7 percent, requiring 59 million dollars in retention 
bonuses to offset.  Since “economic theory says that the more narrowly the compensation 
is targeted, the more cost effective it will be,” the studies in this time period examine 
ways to change CSP and how those changes affect Sailors’ willingness to go to sea 
(Griffis and Golding, 1997, p. 3).   
A comprehensive study by Golding and Griffis (1998) examines three options to 
improve sea-shore balance, readiness, and retention: accelerating the phase-in of sea pay 
increases to target first-term retention, increasing the CSP premium, and a combination of 
the first two options.  These options are compared to an across the board raise in CSP 
rates to account for inflationary losses.  Between 1988 and 1998, CSP lost 88 million 
dollars in value, or 40 percent of its purchasing power, due to inflation (Golding and 
Griffis, 1998).  Each of the proposals cost an amount equal to the value CSP lost from 
inflation and each is designed to prevent pay inversions.  Theoretically, increasing sea 
pay at the first reenlistment point (3-4 years of service) will compensate some Sailors for 
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the additional hardship of sea duty, and they will reenlist or extend (Golding and Griffis, 
1998).  The only question is whether an accelerated phase-in of changes to the CSP table 
or an increase in the CSP premium is more effective.   
Using the ACOL model to predict the effects of each proposal, Golding and 
Griffis (1998) recommend the accelerated phase-in option.  This recommendation is 
made more on the predicted increase in retention than on the predicted increase in man-
years of sea duty.  Increasing the CSP premium encourages extensions of sea duty and 
generates more total man-years of sea duty.  Accelerated phase-in creates 9,113 
additional man-years of sea duty compared to 9,493 for a CSP premium increase, 7,712 
for the combination option, and 2,608 for the across-the-board inflation correction 
(Golding and Griffis, 1998).  An accelerated phase-in of 130 dollars per month increases 
first-term reenlistments by 0.73 percent and second-term reenlistments by 0.36 percent 
compared to 0.48 percent and 0.51 percent for the inflation adjustment, respectively 
(Golding and Griffis, 1998).   
Golding and Griffis (1998) do not recommend increasing the CSP premium 
because it does not provide the same increase in reenlistment as the accelerated phase-in 
of the CSP increase.  As Golding and McArver (2002) explain, CSP is geared more 
towards careerists while the CSP premium is geared towards junior personnel near their 
first reenlistment point.  This is because the CSP premium is paid only after three 
consecutive years of sea duty are completed.  Increasing the CSP premium gained favor 
after the 1996 homebasing survey revealed 65 percent of Sailors would extend for 1 year 
and 22 percent for 3 years for an additional 150 dollars per month in sea pay (Griffis & 
Golding, 1997; Golding & McArver, 2002).  Extensions can be effective since savings 
are realized from permanent change of station and training cost reductions.  Griffis and 
Golding (1997) estimate the net savings of a CSP premium increase to be 182 to 196 
million dollars.  Griffis and Golding (1997) state that increasing the CSP premium is the 
most cost-effective solution to increasing the total amount of time Sailors spend on sea 
duty. 
Despite these apparent contradictions, Golding and McArver (2002) find that any 
increase in sea pay is followed by a subsequent increase in voluntary extensions of sea 
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duty.  Using projected rotation date extension request data, which Golding and McArver 
(2002, p. 15) note are “[the Navy’s] only measure of voluntary behavior,” extension 
requests increase significantly in the years immediately following an increase in CSP.  
The reenlistment benefits are less clear.  The reenlistment figures calculated by Golding 
and Griffis (1998) for an accelerated phase-in CSP increase are half of what would be 
achieved if selective reenlistment bonuses in the same amount are offered (Golding & 
McArver, 2002).  Thus, Golding and McArver (2002, p. 19) conclude that CSP is “an 
effective distribution tool and only secondarily a retention tool.” 
F. SEA-SHORE ROTATION 
The Chief of Naval Personnel (2000), presumably cognizant of the implications of 
the studies described above, endeavored to reduce the length of sea tours for those in the 
career grades, E-5 to E-9.  The stated goal was to limit tour lengths at sea in these grades 
to no more than 48 months.  As shown in Table 2 and Table 3 below, this plan has been 
successful until recently.  For both sea-intensive rates such as BM, FC, and OS and non-
sea-intensive rates such as CTI and MA, these grades experienced reductions 
immediately following the declaration of the policy.  In May 2006, the Chief of Naval 
Personnel (2006), citing a reduction in end strength combined with constant manning 
requirements, was forced to violate this previously stated policy, particularly in sea-
intensive ratings at the E-5 grade.  Table 2 and Table 3 also show that for those personnel 
in their first tours (E-4 and below), sea tour lengths have remained constant. Table 4 and 
Table 5 indicate that even as sea tour lengths have decreased, shore tour lengths for those 
in sea-intensive rates have remained constant or have decreased.  This is due largely to 
the fact that over 19,700 enlisted shore billets have been either eliminated completely or 
filled by civilian employees since 2001 (Chief of Naval Personnel, 2006).  As a result, the 
sea-shore ratio for sea-intensive rates remains well above one except for the most senior 
enlisted personnel.   
Thus, despite the stated desire to minimize the time Sailors experience the 
negative aspects of sea duty, economic reality and technological constraints have limited 
the Navy’s ability to fully implement its policy objectives.  In response, the Navy 
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Personnel Command formed a sea-shore rotation working group to identify various 
personnel and financial strategies which will serve to either reduce the sea-shore ratio or  
compensate for the longer time at sea (Chief of Naval Personnel, 2006).  The effects of 
sea-shore rotation and sea-tour length have implications for the cost-effectiveness of the 








































BMCM 42 36 42 36 42 36 36 36
BMCS 48 36 42 36 42 36 36 36
BMC 48 36 42 36 42 36 42 36
BM1 48 36 42 36 42 36 42 36
BM2 48 36 48 36 48 36 54 36
BM3 60 36 60 36 60 36 60 24
BMSN 60 24 60 24 60 24 60 24
CTICM* 36 72 36 108 36 72 36 36
CTICS* 36 72 36 72 36 72 36 36
CTIC* 36 36 36 72 36 36 36 36
CTI1* 72 36 36 36 72 36 36 36
CTI2* 72 36 72 36 72 36 36 36
CTI3* 72 36 72 36 72 36 24 36
FCCM** 42/42 36/36 45/45 36/36 45/45 36/36 39/39 36/36
FCCS** 42/42 36/36 45/45 36/36 45/45 36/36 39/39 36/36
FCC** 36/36 36/36 36/36 36/36 42/42 36/36 39/39 36/36
FC1** 48/48 36/36 45/45 36/36 42/42 36/36 54/48 36/36
FC2** 48/48 36/36 48/48 36/36 45/42 36/36 60/60 36/36
FC3** 60/60 36/36 60/60 36/36 54/54 36/36 60/60 24/24
FCSN 60 24 60 24 54 24 60 24 
* CTI does OCONUS shore/CONUS shore vice sea/shore    
**(AEGIS/Non-AEGIS)       
 









































MACM*** 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
MACS*** 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
MAC*** 42 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
MA1*** 48 36 42 36 36 36 36 36
MA2*** 60 36 54 36 48 36 36 36
MA3*** 60 36 60 36 54 36 42 36
OSCM 48 36 42 36 42 36 36 36
OSCS 48 36 48 36 48 36 36 36
OSC 48 36 48 36 48 36 48 36
OS1 48 36 48 36 48 36 48 36
OS2 54 36 54 36 54 36 54 36
OS3 60 36 60 36 60 36 60 24
OSSN 60 24 60 24 60 24 60 24
*** MA does OCONUS or Sea/CONUS shore     
 





































BMCM 1.17 1.17 1.17 1 NO NO 
BMCS 1.33 1.17 1.17 1 NO NO 
BMC 1.33 1.17 1.17 1.17 NO YES 
BM1 1.33 1.17 1.17 1.17 NO YES 
BM2 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.5 YES YES 
BM3 1.67 1.67 1.67 2.5 YES YES 
BMSN 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 NO YES 
CTICM* 0.5 0.33 0.5 1 YES NO 
CTICS* 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 YES NO 
CTIC* 1 0.5 1 1 NO NO 
CTI1* 2 1 2 1 NO NO 
CTI2* 2 2 2 1 NO NO 
CTI3* 2 2 2 0.67 NO NO 
FCCM** 1.17/1.17 1.25/1.25 1.25/1.25 1.08/1.08 NO/NO YES/YES 
FCCS** 1.17/1.17 1.25/1.25 1.25/1.25 1.08/1.08 NO/NO YES/YES 
FCC** 1/1 1/1 1.17/1.17 1.08/1.08 YES/YES YES/YES 
FC1** 1.33/1.33 1.25/1.25 1.17/1.17 1.5/1.33 YES/NO YES/YES 
FC2** 1.33/1.33 1.33/1.33 1.25/1.17 1.67/1.67 YES/YES YES/YES 
FC3** 1.67/1.67 1.67/1.67 1.5/1.5 2.5/2.5 YES/YES YES/YES 
FCSN 2.5 2.5 2.25 2.5 NO YES 
* CTI does OCONUS shore/CONUS shore vice sea/shore   
**(AEGIS/Non-AEGIS)     
 







































MACM*** 1 1 1 1 NO NO 
MACS*** 1 1 1 1 NO NO 
MAC*** 1.17 1 1 1 NO NO 
MA1*** 1.33 1.17 1 1 NO NO 
MA2*** 1.67 1.5 1.33 1 NO NO 
MA3*** 1.67 1.67 1.5 1.17 NO YES 
OSCM 1.33 1.17 1.17 1 NO NO 
OSCS 1.33 1.33 1.33 1 NO NO 
OSC 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 NO YES 
OS1 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 NO YES 
OS2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 NO YES 
OS3 1.67 1.67 1.67 2.5 YES YES 
OSSN 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 NO YES 
*** MA does OCONUS or Sea/CONUS shore    
 
Table 5.   Sea/Shore Ratio for Selected Rates from 1998 to Present 
 
G. HISTORY 
1. Early History 
The earliest form of sea duty pay in the U.S. Navy dates back to 1835 and 
governed sea duty pay for Navy officers for almost 75 years. During this time sea duty 
pay was based on within-grade differentials linked to the duty status of the officer.  These 
differentials, with service ashore earning reduced pay, were based on the then mindset 
that sea duty was the normal service of a Sailor and should receive regular pay rather than 
extra pay. Anyone who was not at sea was considered to be performing at less than their 
full duty; therefore, he was only entitled to only a fraction of the regular pay for his 
grade.  Throughout the 1800’s there continued to be a gradual evolution of the sea pay 
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structure.  The Act of June 1, 1860, recognized the length of an officer's cumulative sea 
service as a pay factor in some officer grades while continuing the within-grade 
differentials linked to their operational status.  This act also prescribed pay steps based on 
length of sea service for certain sea-intensive grades; however, these sea-service pay 
steps lasted only a few years (Department of Defense, 2005, p. 457).  These initiatives, 
while short-lived, are not that dissimilar from the elements comprising the structure of the 
CSP program in place today.   
More change occurred with the Act of May 13, 1908, which ended the duty status 
differentials and established pay rates for Navy officers that were based strictly on grade 
and length of service.  With the establishment of these new pay rates for officers assigned 
to sea duty, sea pay would now be seen as extra compensation in addition to the officers’ 
base pay.  Thus, Navy leadership and Congress recognized the difficult nature of sea duty 
and restructured sea pay as a compensating wage for the additional hardship experienced 
by officers at sea.  Officers became entitled to an additional ten percent of base pay while 
performing such duty.  The ten percent provision remained in effect until repealed by the 
Act of June 10, 1922 (Department of Defense, 2005, p. 458). 
 Sea duty pay was revived in 1942 as a wartime measure. Additionally, this was 
the first time enlisted personnel were included within the scope of sea duty pay.  Sea duty 
pay was again instituted as extra compensation with an additional ten percent of base pay 
paid to commissioned officers.  Warrant officers and enlisted personnel would receive an 
additional 20 percent while performing sea duty.  Since the Navy was conscripting its 
force, the reason this pay was authorized during World War II would not appear to be as 
a means to compensate for the arduous nature of fighting at sea.  Instead, this was likely 
used to increase morale of the Sailors, thus providing an explanation for why enlisted 
personnel were not only included for the first time but were also paid a higher percentage 
of their base pay.  A few months later, the Pay Readjustment Act of 1942 codified these 
sea duty pay provisions into permanent law (Department of Defense, 2005, p. 458). 
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2.  Post World War II 
In 1948, an Advisory Commission on Service Pay, at the request of the Secretary 
of Defense, undertook the first comprehensive study of military compensation in nearly 
forty years. This Commission, commonly known as the Hook Commission, 
recommended that sea duty pay be abolished for officers but continue in a modified form 
for enlisted personnel.  For enlisted personnel, the Commission proposed a flat rate 
increase that was similar to accepted industry practice for disagreeable or unpleasant 
work and as a morale factor (Department of Defense, 2005, p. 459).  Agreeing with the 
Hook Commission’s recommendations, Congress adopted the Career Compensation Act 
of 1949.  This act eliminated sea duty pay for officers and changed the way the 
entitlement was computed for enlisted personnel.  
The Career Compensation Act of 1949 provided sufficient pay rates for 1949 but 
the ensuing years brought increasing concerns over retention and morale. The various 
increases in military pay rates over the next thirty years reduced the value of sea pay to 
the enlisted personnel.  The decline in value of sea duty pay reduced its ability to affect 
morale and retention. The ability to impact morale and retention had been one of the 
major reasons behind including enlisted personnel in the sea duty pay program in the first 
place. Sea duty pay was starting to be seen as more of a token entitlement that had little 
incentive or morale value for affected personnel. (Department of Defense, 2005, p. 460)  
3. 1970’s to Present 
The Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1979 adopted a 
new special pay program to address a perceived problem with retention of qualified 
enlisted personnel in the Navy.  This new special pay program would become the CSP 
program known today.  During this time, the Department of Defense noted that sea pay 
had "historically been a means of recognizing and compensating those who were willing 
to serve under the unique conditions of service associated with sea duty" (Department of 
Defense, 2005, p.461).  Citing the unattractive features associated with the “unique 
conditions" of sea duty and the "competition for quality manpower among the services 
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and with civilian industry," the Department of Defense recommended this new career sea 
pay program to achieve "stabilized manning [of Navy ships] with experienced personnel" 
(Department of Defense, 2005, p. 461).  CSP was recommended to Congress as a "special 
pay," but was considered by the Department of Defense to be very important in 
"influencing the decision of skilled individuals to continue a career of service entailing 
repetitive reassignment to duty at sea" (Department of Defense, 2005, p.462).  After the 
passage of the Act of 1979, CSP had become not just an extra compensating wage for the 
unique conditions of sea duty, but also an incentive pay designed to meet the Navy’s 
manpower management objectives.  Consequently, the scope of the CSP program 
changed significantly at this time. 
In order to meet the goal of the new sea duty pay program, Congress continued to 
adjust CSP rates throughout the 1980’s.  The Navy's shortage of petty officers in the six 
to twelve year range of service prompted more increases in pay rates.  This was the first 
instance where the Navy used CSP to specifically "target" or "focus" on special retention 
problem areas by providing retention incentives to Navy personnel coming to the end of 
their first term of enlistment. (Department of Defense, 2005, p.463) 
The Military Pay and Allowances Benefits Act of 1980 adopted an entirely new 
structure of special pay for CSP.  Special pay for career sea duty was again authorized for 
officers as well as enlisted personnel in pay grades E-4 and above.  The only exception 
being officers in pay grades O-1 and O-2 who had less than four years of active enlisted 
or noncommissioned warrant officer service (Department of Defense, 2005, p.463).  
Officer sea pay was reinstituted "because of the arduous duty and family separations 
involved in long deployments at sea and because of retention problems among Navy 
officers in certain skills” (Department of Defense, 2005, p.464).  Career sea duty pay 
rates were again increased because such action "specifically targets manpower dollars in 
an efficient way to improve the retention of Navy personnel in sea service skills" 
(Department of Defense, 2005, p. 464).  The last change brought about from this 
provision was the establishment of the Career Sea Pay Premium (CSPP).  This special 
provision allowed an additional $100 per month to be paid to any member of a uniformed 
service entitled to CSP for each subsequent month over 36 months of consecutive sea 
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duty (Department of Defense, 2005, p.463).  CSPP was adopted at the urging of the Navy 
"to compensate ... members who are on prescribed sea tours of greater than three years 
and as an incentive for ... members who are on three year sea tours or less and who 
volunteer beyond the prescribed sea service tour" (Department of Defense, 2005, p. 464). 
This revised CSP program was intended primarily to address retention problems. 
In 1980, the Senate Armed Services Committee stated in Report No. 96-1051 that “sea 
pay rates at the current levels were insignificant in relation to basic pay and as such are 
not achieving the career force retention and accession objectives which currently impact 
the at sea duty manning. The additional compensation realized from the proposed sea pay 
increases will be most effective in the retention of skilled enlisted personnel. This sea pay 
proposal was a specifically directed cost-effective method of correcting the critical 
shortage of career force personnel in sea duty assignments.” (quoted in Department of 
Defense, 2005, p. 465) 
Career sea pay was one way to influence personnel to enter and remain in skill 
specialties entailing sea duty.  These provisions enacted during the early 1980’s have 
started to highlight the many challenges faced with the design and implementation of the 
CSP program. 
The later half of the 1980’s saw only a few changes in CSP.   There were further 
revisions of the CSP program at the urging of the Department of Defense which entailed 
more structural changes.  The CSP rates were increased for warrant officers in pay grades 
W-3 and W-4 along with the addition of four new cumulative-years-of-sea-duty 
categories for all warrant and commissioned officers.  Additionally, the prohibition on 
payment of CSP to officers in pay grades O-1 and O-2 with less than four years of active 
enlisted or noncommissioned warrant officer service was removed.   
Another change to take place during this time was in the definition of “sea duty.”  
Prior to this, the term “sea duty” referred to only the time spent on a ship while it was out 
to sea. This earlier, narrow definition of sea duty limited the rate of sea credit an 
individual accumulated. Since sea pay was based on the cumulative-years-of-sea-duty, 
the amount of sea pay and the rate of any sea pay increases were also limited.  This had 
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the potential to influence the willingness of personnel to enter and remain in sea duty 
assignments.  The term "sea duty" as now defined includes all time spent on a ship 
whether it is at sea or in port. (Department of Defense, 2005, p. 469)   
This new way of defining sea duty had two effects.  First, this new definition of 
sea duty allowed members assigned to ships whose primary mission is accomplished in 
port to draw sea pay whenever the ship is away from its homeport.  Prior practices 
limited members assigned to such ships entitlement to sea pay only when their ship was 
away from its homeport for more than 30 consecutive days.  Second, it allowed members 
to accumulate sea duty credit while assigned to the same type of duty.  Although, 
individuals serving in these types of sea duty assignments do not receive sea pay 
regularly, this change had long term implications for personnel and their career decisions. 
If an individual stayed in the Navy long enough to reach their next sea duty assignment 
they could potentially benefit from an increase in the amount of CSP they might be 
entitled to from the additional sea credit accumulated.   
The most recent changes to CSP were initiated by the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.  A few changes in the rate structure for both CSP 
and CSPP were made and the congressionally established pay table that had been in 
existence since the Military Pay and Allowances Benefits Act of 1980 was eliminated.   
Additionally, service secretaries received authorization to prescribe the CSP and CSPP 
rates for all members serving under their jurisdiction.  The significance of this change is 
that personnel from each military branch could receive CSP at a different rate.  Also, the 
services could change the CSP and CSPP rates without formal authorization by Congress; 
however, the funds must still be appropriated by Congress.  The only stipulation placed 
by Congress was the maximum monthly rate for CSP was set at $750 and the maximum 
monthly rate for CSPP was placed at $350. (Department of Defense, 2005, p. 473) 
As one of the oldest special pays in existence, sea pay has continued to evolve to 
meet the needs of the Navy and military services.  The legislative authority behind CSP 
(37 U.S.C. S305a) states that CSP is to provide a special payment to personnel serving on 
sea duty in recognition of the greater-than-normal rigors or service attending such duty, 
and to efficiently target manpower dollars to improve the retention of personnel in sea-
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service skills.  The most recent Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 
(OPNAVINST) 7220.14, states that Career Sea Pay is to provide a key distribution tool 
for the Navy as well as provide a special payment in recognition of the greater-than-
normal rigors of sea duty, the arduous duty involved in long deployments, and the 
repetitive nature of assignment to such duty (Chief of Naval Operations, 2005).  The one 
common thread throughout the history of this program is that CSP attempts to 
compensate for the greater-than-normal rigors of the sea duty.  What is not clear is the 
whether or not CSP effectively meets manpower management goal of stabilizing the 
manning levels of Navy ships with experienced personnel.  
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The military compensation system differs greatly from systems found in similar 
hierarchically structured civilian organizations.  While some find these differences to be 
problematic, others suggest that the unique characteristics of the military promotion 
process and the distribution of preferences of the people serving minimize the effects of 
the differences.  Career Sea Pay is one component of the military compensation system.  
Since the late 1800’s when sea duty pay was structured as an addition to base pay, the 
Navy has used CSP to overcome the hardships imposed by sea duty.  Hence, CSP could 
rightly be classified as a compensating wage.  Although the theory of compensating 
wages has been accepted for many years, empirical evidence shows that effort is 
compensated more than unpleasant job characteristics.  One unpleasant job characteristic, 
long working hours, can be measured to see the effectiveness of CSP as a compensating 
wage.  Over the last twenty-five years, CSP has been studied more for its retention effects 
than for its compensating effects.  The use of CSP has an impact on such retention factors 
as military-civilian pay differential, marriage, and geographic location; however, the 
most direct and important effect of CSP is on sea duty.  Sea duty has an inverse 
relationship with retention.  Since CSP compensates for sea duty and raising CSP 
generates more sea duty, CSP is a less efficient and effective retention tool than bonuses 
geared toward encouraging reenlistment.  A thorough analysis of the Navy’s use and 
intentions of sea duty pay reveals that one constant goal of this special pay is to reward 
 30
the extra effort service at sea demands.  In conclusion, this review suggests that the best 
way to study the cost effectiveness of CSP is to investigate its effect on sea duty.   
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III.  DATA COLLECTION AND PRESENTATION 
A.  CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Having reviewed relevant literature and previous studies, the project team 
endeavored to collect data necessary to perform an empirical and statistical analysis of 
the effectiveness of CSP and CSPP payments as means to encourage personnel to serve 
sea duty.  These data came from a variety of sources throughout the Navy, the 
Department of Defense, and the federal government.  Each of the primary types of data is 
discussed.  First, inflation data and its use in this project to normalize various costs and 
pays are explained.  Second, survey responses related to satisfaction with sea duty and 
pay are presented.  Third, historical sea tour completion data are explained.  Fourth, the 
procedures and assumptions for collecting and aggregating various personnel data that 
indicate the number of additional months personnel are willing to serve at sea are 
described.  Finally, data related to costs that this project hypothesizes have influenced the 
creation of those additional months at sea are presented.  Appendix B contains the most 
of the data documented in this chapter. 
B. INFLATION DATA 
Historical base pay and sea pay tables from 1983-2006 were retrieved from the 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS).  To accurately compare dollar values 
across time periods, a standard needed to be established and applied to the values to 
correct for inflation.  There is no one correct way to calculate inflation.  The federal 
government, for example, has multiple economic indicators that are used for adjusting 
nominal dollar values.  This project uses the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to calculate 
inflation. The CPI is published by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of 




Navy facilities are located near urban areas, the Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers (CPI-U) is used in this project as the economic indicator to adjust dollar 
values across years. 
To make consistent comparisons of enlisted pay rates over time using the CPI, a 
base year must be selected.  Next, a multiplier is derived for each year to convert 
historical Then Year dollars to Base Year dollars.  For this project, all dollar values will 
be adjusted using 2006 as the base year.  The first step in this process is to subtract the 
Then Year CPI from the Base Year CPI.  The difference is then divided by the Then Year 
CPI.  The resultant quotient is multiplied by 100 to yield the inflation rate percentage.  
The formula for calculating inflation is provided in Equation 1. 
 
[(Base Year CPI – Then Year CPI) / Then Year CPI] * 100 = Inflation Rate 
Equation 1.  Inflation Rate Formula 
 
The year 1998 is used as an example to show how a value for a given year was 
converted to 2006 dollars.  The CPI yearly averages for 1998 and 2006 are 163.0 and 
201.6, respectively.  Inserting these values into Equation 1 as presented in Figure 1, the 
inflation rate from 1998 to 2006 is calculated to be 23.68 percent. This process was 
repeated for years 1983-2006. 
 
Inflation Rate = [(Base Year CPI – Then Year CPI) / Then Year CPI] * 100  
= [(201.6 – 163.0) / 163.0] * 100 
= [(38.6) / 163.0] * 100 
= [.2368] * 100 
= 23.68% 
Figure 1.   Inflation Calculation 
 
With the inflation rates from all previous years to the base year of 2006 known, 
the Then Year dollars need to be converted to 2006 dollars for an accurate comparison. 
Going back to the 1998 example, a comparison can be conducted on base pay for an E-5 
with over six cumulative years of service (CYS) between 1998 and 2006.  Historical pay 
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data from DFAS indicates that the monthly basic pay for 1998 and 2006 is $1,558.20 and 
$2,273.70, respectively.  The monthly pay of $1,558.20 is multiplied by the inflation rate, 
23.68 percent, to yield the adjusted value to be added to original value to correct for 
inflation as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Then Year Value * Inflation Rate = Inflation Product 
$1558.20 * 23.68% = $368.98 
Inflation Product + Then Year Value = Base Year Value 
$1558.20 + 368.98 = $1927.18 
Figure 2.   Base Year Calculation for Monthly Basic Pay, E-5 with 6 CYS 
 
The monthly basic pay for an E-5 with over six CYS in 1998 is actually worth 
$1927.18 in 2006 dollars.  Basic pay for 1998 can now be accurately compared with 
2006.  The actual pay in 2006 for an E-5 with over six CYS was $2273.00.  This 
calculation clearly illustrates an E5 over six CYS earned more money in 2006 than he or 
she would have in 1998.  These calculations were repeated to adjust base pay and sea pay 
from 1983 to 2006 to values in 2006 dollars. These values can be used for trend analysis 
to compare sea pay values for various pay grades across multiple cumulative years of sea 
duty (CYSD).  
C. ARGUS CAREER MILESTONE TRACKING SYSTEM SURVEY DATA 
The Naval Personnel Command (NPC) Center for Personal and Professional 
Development, Analysis maintains data from the ARGUS Career Milestone Tracking 
System.  For this project, NPC provided ARGUS survey questionnaire data for each 
Navy active duty enlisted pay grade.  These data were provided in two sections: before 21 
August 2003, and after 21 August 2003.  Within each section, the six questions pertinent 
to this project were provided by pay grade of the survey respondent, and the number of 
responses for each choice on a scale of one to seven.  Table 6 shows the ARGUS survey 
questions of interest for this project.  
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1. Number of hours put in at sea to get the job done.
2. Number of hours put in while in port to get the job done.
3. Number of hours put in on an average day to get the job done.
4. Amount of pay you receive.
5. Amount of base pay
6. Amount of Sea Pay you receive
 
 
Table 6.   ARGUS survey questions. (NPC, Center for Personal and Professional 
Development, Analysis) 
 
ARGUS is a web-based survey that gathers Sailors’ responses on quality-of-life 
issues such as Navy services, job satisfaction, and military pay and benefits that affect 
their future career decisions.  Respondents indicate their opinion on each issue on a scale 
of one through seven, with one indicating an issue influenced a Sailor to consider leaving 
the Navy and seven indicating an issue influenced a Sailor to consider staying in the 
Navy.  The survey is nominally required whenever sailors reach career milestone events 
such as reenlistment, advancement, transfer, or re-designation (Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2006).  Using the data provided, the questions from each section were 
combined into three pay-grade groupings: E1-E3, E4-E6, and E7-E9.  Once that process 
was complete, the average response to each question for each pay-grade group was 
computed.  Some questions had more responses than others so it is assumed that those 
questions should carry more weight towards the group average.  In order to capture the 
relative importance of the choices within each question, the weighted average method 
was used to compute the pay-grade group average response for each question of interest 
from the survey.  The weighted average was computed for each pay-grade group using 
Equation 2. 
(Rank of Question [from 1 to 7])*(Number of Responses for the Rank) 




Equation 2.  Weighted Average Formula for ARGUS Survey Responses 
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Appendix B provides the summary of the total number of responses and the 
weighted averages of those responses for the two periods of data provided by pay-grade 
group.  From these data, the project team performed a trend analysis to investigate the 
influence of quality-of-life and job satisfaction on the willingness of personnel (by pay-
grade group) to stay in the Navy. 
D. PRESCRIBED SEA TOUR (PST) DATA 
For this project, the Allocation and Statistics Branch of NPC provided a data file 
that gave a current snapshot of all enlisted active duty personnel in all ratings who have 
exceeded their prescribed sea tour (PST).  The file contained various parameters for an 
individual that existed at a time the information was requested.  These parameters include 
the Unit Identification Code (UIC) of the person’s assignment, the Date Received (or day 
the person arrived at their listed assignment), Command Name, and the Date Transferred 
(date the person transferred or will transfer).  These parameters were provided in addition 
to standard information such as the individual’s rate and pay grade.  Some individuals 
were not counted as they were still completing their PST (split tours) or were in ratings 
that didn't have a PST.  CTs and MAs are examples of ratings not having a PST. 
Using this information, the number of personnel who exceeded their PST for each 
year was identified by pay grade for fiscal years 2000 to 2006.  Additionally, the total 
number of personnel who exceeded their PST in each of the five ratings of interest was 
also identified by pay grade for fiscal years 2000 to 2006.  Because individuals who 
exceeded their will usually have completed multiple sea tours, NPC analysts had to 
review each member's history to sum tour lengths when they went from sea to sea in 
order to get the most accurate data.  Currently, there is no way to identify the exact 
moment when individuals exceed their PST.  This project’s authors assumed the date 
individuals arrive (Date Received) at the listed assignment is the moment they exceeded 
their PST.  Appendix B shows the summary of the PST information provided by 
NPC.Using this information, a trend analysis was performed to investigate potential 
reasons for an increase or decrease in personnel exceeding their PST within each rating of 
interest and the Navy as a whole. 
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E. DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER DATA 
1. End Strength Data 
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) provided quarterly end strength 
data for all Navy active duty enlisted ratings for years 2001 through 2006.  These data 
were provided in three pay-grade groupings: E1-E3, E4-E6, and E7-E9.  Within each 
grouping, the number of personnel in each rate was provided based on the type of duty to 
which they are assigned.  The Navy uses a numerical classification system to indicate the 
type of duty a member is performing.  These codes, as specified in MILPERSMAN 1306-
102 are summarized as follows (Chief of Naval Personnel, 2003): 
 
Sea/Shore Type Duty Code "1":  Duty performed in United States (U.S.) 
(including Hawaii and Anchorage, Alaska) land-based activities where 
members are not required to be absent from the corporate limits of their 
duty station in excess of 150 days per year, or long-term schooling of 18 
or more months; 
Sea/Shore Type Duty Code "2":  Duty performed in commissioned 
vessels and deployable squadrons homeported in the U.S. (including 
Hawaii and Alaska); U.S. land-based activities and embarked staffs, which 
require members to operate away from their duty station in excess of 150 
days per year; 
Sea/Shore Type Duty Code "3":  Duty performed in a land-based 
activity, which does not require members to be absent more than 150 days 
per year, but is credited as sea duty for rotational purposes only due to the 
relative undesirability of the geographic area; 
Sea/Shore Type Duty Code "4":  Duty performed in commissioned 
vessels and deployable squadrons homeported overseas; overseas land-
based activities and embarked staffs, which require members to operate 
away from their duty station in excess of 150 days per year; 
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Sea/Shore Type Duty Code "6":  Duty performed in overseas land-based 
activities, which are credited as shore duty for rotational purposes.  
Members are not required to be absent from corporate limits of their duty 
station in excess of 150 days per year. 
 
Per OPNAVINST 7220.14 which defines CSP and CSPP, only those personnel 
serving in type duty code “2” and “4” billets when embarked on a vessel that can get 
underway are entitled to special pay (Chief of Naval Operations, 2005).  Therefore, using 
the DMDC data provided, the total number of personnel serving in type duty code “2” 
and “4” billets were summed for each rating of interest (BM, CTI, FC, MA, OS) within 
each pay-grade group in each period data were available.  This total is the number of 
people eligible for CSP and potentially CSPP during each period.  A similar summing 
procedure was undertaken for those personnel assigned to type duty code “1,” “3,” and 
“6” billets to determine the total number of personnel within each rating of interest 
assigned to a land-based billet who were ineligible for CSP or CSPP.  From these data, a 
trend analysis was performed to investigate the percentage of personnel within each 
rating assigned to CSP and CSPP eligible billets over time.  These data are presented in 
Appendix B. 
 2. Personnel Tracking Data 
DMDC constructed a data set for this project from individual information within 
its Enlisted Master File.  This data set covered all enlisted active duty personnel in the 
ratings of interest from October 2000 through December 2006.  Each file compares 
various parameters for an individual at the base time to the same parameters for that 
individual that existed at a time six months later than the base time.  These parameters 
include the UIC of the unit to which the person was assigned at the given time, the End of 
Active Obligated Service Date (EAOS) the person had at the given time, the duty type 
code for the UIC that person was assigned at the given time, and the number of months 
that person had served at in that UIC and pay grade.  These parameters were provided in 
addition to standard information such as the individual’s rate and pay grade. 
Using these parameters, DMDC compared the individuals’ status at the base time 
to his or her status six months later.  For some of these comparisons, DMDC generated a 
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set of “Yes” or “No” conditions that could be used to sort and aggregate the individual 
data.  These conditions were specified for whether there was a change in an individual’s 
UIC, EAOS, or duty type.  If the change in EAOS condition was returned as “Yes,” 
DMDC calculated the number of months the EAOS was extended or reduced.  
Furthermore, DMDC specified if the duty type at each time period qualified as sea duty 
eligible for CSP and CSPP.  In addition to the “Yes” or “No” comparisons, DMDC also 
calculated the number of months the individual was at his or her UIC and within his or 
her pay grade at each time period.  The former information could be used in conjunction 
with data for required sea tour lengths to determine the number of additional months of 
sea duty that would be generated if an individual changed his or her EAOS.  The latter 
information could be used to determine if the individual was promoted in the six-month 
interval by noting if the amount of time in pay grade at the base time was more than the 
time in pay grade six months later.  Using the information available in this data set, the 
project team endeavored to extract a measure of the number of additional months of sea 
duty that was generated during each six-month period from three different means: a 
consecutive sea tour, an extension, and a reenlistment.  These means and the process to 
measure the months generated through these means are described below. 
  To determine if an individual would serve additional sea duty through a given 
method, different conditions were compared.  For a consecutive sea tour to be performed, 
two conditions need to be met.  First, the individual’s UIC would have to change during 
the six-month period; second, the person would have to be serving in a sea duty type code 
at the beginning and end of the six-month period.  If both these conditions were true, that 
individual was recorded as performing consecutive sea tours.  Calculating the number of 
months of additional sea duty created through this method required an assumption since 
the change in UIC could be for a number of reasons.  For example, there could be a case 
where a person currently serving onboard a ship that is in a maintenance period could be 
transferred temporarily to another ship due to get underway for a deployment if the latter 
ship had a manning shortfall.  In this case, no real additional sea duty is generated since 
the individual is merely completing the current sea tour in another UIC.  In contrast, the 
individual may have transferred from one sea duty billet to another after completing a full 
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prescribed sea tour and his or her EAOS is far enough in the future where that individual 
will complete another full prescribed sea tour.  There is also the case in which the 
individual’s EAOS is scheduled prior to completing the nominal length of the second sea 
tour.  Thus, to calculate the number of additional months of sea duty generated by an 
individual meeting the conditions of consecutive sea duty, it was assumed that one half of 
the prescribed sea tour length for that individual’s rate at the time would be completed. 
The processes for determining whether an individual extended or reenlisted while 
at sea are similar.  The determining factor for distinguishing between the two is the length 
of change in an individual’s EAOS.  Again, two conditions needed to be met to determine 
if one of the situations existed.  First, an individual needed to be serving in a sea duty 
billet at the base time. Second, the date of the individual’s EAOS must have changed in 
the six-month period of interest.  If both conditions were true, the length of the change in 
EAOS was examined to determine if an extension or reenlistment occurred.  If the length 
of change was less than thirty-six months, the change was assumed to be an extension; if 
greater than or equal to thirty-six months, a reenlistment.  This distinction was made 
because for a Sailor to be eligible for a Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB), a thirty-six 
month or longer service contract must be signed.   
The SRB pay could be an influence in the decision in addition to CSP or CSPP; 
therefore, to conduct any additional analysis, this distinction needed to be made.  The 
number of additional months of sea duty generated by this decision was determined by 
comparing the length of change in EAOS to the number of remaining months in the 
individual’s current sea tour.  If the individual was serving in a sea duty billet at the end 
of the six-month period and his or her change in EAOS was longer than the remaining 
number of months remaining in the sea tour (determined by subtracting the number of 
months served at the UIC at the base time from the length of a prescribed sea tour for the 
individual’s rate), the remaining number of months in the sea tour was used as the value 
for additional months generated; otherwise, the length of change in EAOS was used for 
the number of additional months generated.  Consequently, the project team assumed that 
an extension or reenlistment decision was made at the base time.  If the individual was no 
longer serving in a sea duty billet at the end of the six-month period, the number of 
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additional months of sea duty generated was found by subtracting the number of months 
the person was at his or her UIC at the end of the six-month period from six months. 
For each method, an individual was determined to be eligible for CSPP at the time 
of his or her decision.  To be eligible for CSPP, an individual must serve 36 consecutive 
months in a sea duty billet.  Thus, if an individual was in a UIC classified as a sea duty 
billet and she or he had been in that UIC for 36 months at the base time, the individual 
was considered eligible for CSPP payments. 
The above evaluations were made for each individual.  Once complete, the total 
number of consecutive sea tours, extensions, and reenlistments as well as the number of 
additional months of sea duty created during that six-month period were aggregated by 
rate for the ratings of interest.  Although the number of months of sea duty generated for 
an individual often was longer than the six-month period of interest, all of those months 
were credited to the time period examined.  This is a reasonable assumption because the 
decision to perform consecutive sea duty, extend, or reenlist was made based on 
conditions (i.e., CSP rates, CSPP rates, SRB rates, and advancement opportunity) 
existing at that time. 
To analyze the impact of advancement potential as a factor in these decisions in 
the project, pay grades E1 through E3 were aggregated as were pay grades E7 through 
E9.  This was done since exams are only offered for advancement to pay grades E4 
through E7.  This process was repeated at six-month intervals beginning in October 2001 
through April 2006 to provide data for fiscal years 2002 through 2006.  The results of this 
process are presented in Appendix B. 
F. COST DATA 
1. Annual CSP and CSPP Cost Data 
NPC Resource Management Division maintains data on annual payments made 
for CSP and CSPP programs.  For this project, NPC provided the total annual costs of the 
CSP and CSPP programs for fiscal years fiscal years 2000 through 2006 and the total 
annual costs for the five ratings of interests for fiscal years 2005 and 2006. The by-rating 
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data is limited because the Navy did not start accumulating CSP and CSPP pay data by 
rating until 2005.  Previously, CSP and CSPP costs were only collected by UIC.  
Consequently, the only relevant CSP and CSPP cost data available for fiscal years 2002 
through 2004 is aggregate cost for the entire Navy.  To estimate these costs by rating for 
this time period, an assumption had to be made.  The assumption used for this project is 
that CSP and CSPP costs for a given year are proportional to the number of personnel 
within a given rating in that year.  This assumption is considered valid since the 
proportion of personnel within each rating grouping is generally constant over the years 
of interest as indicated by the end strength data provided in Appendix B.   
Knowing the CSP and CSPP costs by rating in fiscal year 2005 and the total CSP 
and CSPP costs in fiscal year 2005, a ratio of individual rating cost to total cost was be 
calculated.  This ratio was adjusted for fiscal years 2002 through 2004 by multiplying it 
by the ratio of the average number of personnel in each rating of interest assigned to a 
type duty “2” or “4” billet in one of those years to the average number of personnel in 
each rating of interest assigned to a type duty “2” or “4” billet in fiscal year 2005.  After 
this adjustment, the per-rating CSP and CSPP costs were determined by multiplying the 
total CSP and CSPP cost for the fiscal year being determined to the adjusted 2005 rating 
cost to total cost ratio.  An example to calculate Boatswain Mate CSP cost for fiscal year 
2003 is shown in Figure 3 below. 
 
BM TYPE 2, 4BM
TOTAL BM
TOTAL BM TYPE 2,4
AVG FY03 PERSONNELFY05 CSP COST FY03 CSP COST FY03 CSP COST
FY05 CSP COST  AVG FY05 PERSONNEL
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ =⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
Figure 3.     CSP Cost Estimation Calculation Example 
 
The cost data, converted to 2006 dollars by the process described in the Inflation 
Data section above, is presented in Appendix B.  This project explored the relationship 
between changes in CSP and CSPP payment amounts over time using the information 
provided by NPC.  Additionally, the trend over time was compared to other career 
milestone changes such as extensions, reenlistments, and willingness to complete sea 
tours to determine if CSP and CSPP haves some influence on these factors. 
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2. Selective Reenlistment Bonus Cost Data 
The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel, Training and 
Education) (MTP&E) is responsible for the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) 
program.  Program data are maintained by the Enlisted Bonus Programs for the Chief of 
Naval Personnel (OPNAV N130D). OPNAV N130D provided the total number of SRB’s 
and the associated dollar amount for all naval personnel within the ratings of interests for 
this project.  These data were further subdivided by Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) 
and by reenlistment eligibility zones.  NEC’s are specific codes designated to individuals 
who possess a specialized skill or qualification.  The total number of SRB’s and 
associated dollars amounts of all three zones were summed for each rate and the rate’s 
associated NEC’s from 2000 to 2006.  Those data are provided in Appendix B. 
Per OPNAVINST 1160.9, SRB’s are only eligible to sailors who have completed 
at least 17 continuous months of active naval service but not more than 20 years of active 
military service. The minimum length of reenlistment for which an individual can be 
eligible for an SRB is three years. There are three zones a Sailor can reenlist and receive 
an SRB: Zone A, a Sailor has served a minimum of 17 months but not more than six 
years; Zone B, a Sailor has served a minimum of six years but not more than 10 years; 
Zone C, a Sailor has served a minimum of 10 years but not more than 14 years.  Rating or 
skills meriting an SRB are assigned a specific award level ranging from .5 to 15 in .5 
increments.  The level of SRB payment also varies and is capped at a $90,000 ceiling.  
The formula for determining the SRB amount is monthly basic pay multiplied by the 
additional months of reenlistment.  The product value is then divided by 12.  The quotient 
value is then multiplied by the award level for the reenlistment bonus payout. (Chief of 
Naval Operations, 2007)  The formula for determining the SRB is shown in Equation 3.  
 
[(Monthly Basic Pay * Additional OBLISERV in months) / 12] * Award Level 
 Equation 3.  SRB Calculation Formula.  
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MTP&E uses the SRB as a monetary tool to achieve retention requirements 
necessary for appropriately structuring the enlisted force.  MTP&E conducts reviews at 
least annually to ensure sufficient awards levels are offered to critical ratings and NECs 
to maintain proper manning.  It then publishes the changes via naval message.  The 
review process takes several key factors into consideration, including a history or 
projected trend of under manning in a rate or NEC, high training and replacement costs, 
and the criticality of a skill for the Navy to successfully complete its mission.  MTP&E 
only makes the changes only if they are confident it will improve retention in the targeted 
rate or NEC.  MTP&E has the option of increasing or decreasing award levels and SRB 
payments in any zone. (Chief of Naval Operations, 2007)  This review process explains 
why Boatswain Mates were first awarded SRB’s in 2005 and 2006. 
3. Advancement Cost Data 
a. Naval Education and Training Professional Development and 
Technical Center Data 
The Naval Education and Training Professional Development and 
Technical Center (NETPDTC) maintains data on advancement statistics.  For this project, 
NETPDTC provided the number of personnel advanced and the total number of people 
taking an advancement exam at every Navy UIC for all advancement exams (E-4 to E-7) 
for fiscal years 2002 through 2006.  Using information provided by DMDC, each UIC 
was identified by its type duty code.  Once this process was complete, the total number of 
people advanced and the total number of people taking each advancement exam for each 
cycle was aggregated by type duty and rating of interest.  With this information, two 
things were determined.  First, it is possible to see if there is an increased opportunity for 
personnel to advance while in a sea duty billet or if the opportunity is greater for those on 
shore duty.  Second, with the total number of people being advanced during each 
advancement cycle, the cost to the Navy for advancing these personnel was calculated by 
making a couple of assumptions.  This procedure is described below. 
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b. Advancement Pay Differential Costs 
To calculate the cost of advancing personnel, it is necessary to determine 
the base pay differential between different rates.  This was accomplished using historical 
pay tables available from DFAS.  Since base pay is a function of both pay grade and 
years of service, an expected value for the pay differential must be calculated.  The 
expected value is found by summing the product of the pay differential at a given year of 
service and the probability of advancing to the next pay grade in that year of service.   
Statistical theory suggests that for large populations, the probability 
distribution is likely to be normal; however, in the Navy advancement system, points 
toward advancement are awarded for those that pass an advancement exam but who are 
not advanced.  These points are cumulative and apply to subsequent exam scores to 
increase the likelihood of advancing over time.  Thus, this project applied a normal 
probability distribution with a slightly positive skew for each pay grade bounded by 
minimum time-in-rate requirements at the low end and high year tenure requirements at 
the high end.  If pay differentials are not given for to the high year tenure value, this 
value was not available in the pay table or was the same as the previous year of service 
differential.  High year tenure for pay grades E-4 through E-6 for the years of interest are 
identified in Naval Administrative Message (NAVADMIN) 208/02 and in NAVADMIN 
056/05 which are summarized in Table 7 (Chief of Naval Operations 2002 and 2005).  
The expected value for pay differentials by pay grade and year is presented in Table 8.  
 
PAY GRADE HIGH YEAR TENURE (YEARS) 
 2002 – MAR 2005 MAR 2005 - PRESENT 
E-4 10 10 
E-5 20 14 
E-6 20 20 




Promotion to Pay 
Grade 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
E4 $144.63 $131.28 $170.05 $174.26 $180.35 $185.86
E5 $124.95 $151.47 $171.42 $195.09 $201.87 $208.14
E6 $200.19 $221.22 $242.15 $262.19 $271.38 $279.81
E7 $268.65 $313.91 $312.83 $335.04 $346.87 $357.53
Table 8.   Expected Value of Basic Pay Advancement Differentials 2001-2006 
(Current Year Dollars) 
 
Exams are offered twice each year for advancement to pay grades E-4 through E-
6 (in March and September) and once each year for advancement to E-7 (January).  
Additionally, personnel who are advanced are not immediately paid at their new pay 
grade, but are staggered based on their advancement exam score.  Thus, an assumption 
has to be made to calculate the advancement cost resulting from each exam cycle.  
Conservatively, this project assumes that all personnel advanced during a cycle are paid 
immediately.  Therefore, personnel advanced in the September cycle are paid for all 12 
months of the following fiscal year, personnel advanced in January for the remaining 
eight months of the fiscal year, and those personnel advanced in March for the remaining 
six months of the fiscal year.    
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the project data.  Each data set was described by source, 
content, and the procedures undertaken to convert the raw data to a form useful for 
analysis with assumptions explicitly stated. The following chapter describes the project’s 
methodology for using these data to analyze the cost effectiveness of CSP and CSPP as 
means to generate sea duty for the Navy.   
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter describes the procedures and reasoning applied to examine the 
effectiveness of CSP as a compensating wage and a retention tool. The data collected and 
described in Chapter III allow for empirical and statistical analysis to be performed.  
These analyses determine relationships (if any) between the amount of compensation 
allotted for the Career Sea Pay and the willingness to perform sea duty.  The chapter is 
organized into three sections.  First, the process for analyzing the change in real 
purchasing power of CSP over time is presented.  This trend will be analyzed by pay 
grades examining the change in CSP over time.  Second, the approach to empirical 
analysis of trends in survey data and sea tour extension rates is outlined.  The goal of this 
section is to estimate the influence the 2002 change in CSP rates had on job satisfaction 
and the desire to remain at sea.  Finally, the chapter discusses the statistical methods used 
to measure if a significant relationship exists between various forms of compensation and 
the number of months of sea duty generated by extension or reenlistment.  This is done to 
assess the monetary value of CSP as a retention incentive. 
B.  INFLATION AND THE REAL VALUE OF CAREER SEA PAY 
1. Purchasing Power and the Consumer Price Index 
Due to inflation, the purchasing power of an individual’s dollar declines from 
Year 1 to Year 2.  The rate of inflation estimates the rate of this decline.  Therefore, 
trying to compare the amount of compensation for a pay grade over any period of time 
without taking inflation into consideration is of little value since the same dollar amounts 
have differing purchasing power. 
As mentioned in Chapter III, the CPI-U is used as the benchmark for converting 
Then Year dollars to 2006 dollars for the comparison.  The CPI-U was chosen for two 
reasons.  First, a majority of sea-based Navy bases are located within urban areas. 
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Second, the CPI-U encompasses a sample size of 30,000 individuals representing 87 
percent of the total national population which provides data on all their purchases, the 
largest representation of its kind.  The BLS further classifies these expenditures into 200 
categories and eight major groups.  The products purchased from the samples are then 
inputted into statistical programs that calculate the CPI for the time period of the 
purchases.  This new CPI number represents the difference in the price the consumers 
paid for that basket of goods from the last observation period.  The CPI-U data reflects 
total net changes of all allowable goods and services purchased by urban households. 
With CSP values from 1983-2006 converted to 2006 dollars, CSP rates for 
selected pay grades can be charted and graphed to show trends due to inflation and 
changes in the CSP program.  This project will use two samples with different rank and 
time of service for comparison and analysis.  The first sample will be an E-4 with over 
four years of service and the second will be an E-5 with over six years of service. These 
two samples were chosen because they represent a typical Sailor at a point where a 
retention decision might be made.  The trend in the value of CSP can provide insight into 
whether the CSP program has the same effect in compensating sailors in recent years as it 
did since the last congressional change. 
2. Compensation for Hours Worked at Sea 
Chapter II described the difference in the number of hours per week the Navy 
expects Sailors to work while in port and while underway.  One simple way to measure 
the effectiveness of sea pay is to convert the payments into an hourly rate for the extra 
hours worked at sea.  For this analysis, the CSP payments must be treated as an annuity 
payment.  Since the Navy pays its personnel twice each month and each payment is for 
work accomplished, CSP payments could be considered an ordinary annuity (Megginson 
and Smart, 2006).  The Navy specifies the number of underway days per quarter that are 
authorized for its fleet units.  While this number varies from year to year, it is 
approximately 25 out of 90 days.  The project team assumed all 25 days are spent 
underway at the end of the quarter.  This allows CSP payments made earlier in the 
quarter to earn interest while not performing duty at sea which is meant to be 
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compensated.  The project team assumes an eight percent annual return on CSP 
payments.  Dividing the value of the CSP payments over the 3-month period by the extra 
hours worked for the time at sea during this period, an hourly rate of CSP can be 
calculated.  This hourly rate will be calculated for various pay grades and years of sea 
duty over the period 2002 through 2006 in 2006 dollars.  The equation for the future 

























   
where PMT = ½ monthly CSP payment, r = Annual rate of return, and n = Number of pay 
periods 
Equation 4. Future Value of an Ordinary Annuity 
 
C. METHOD FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
1. Argus Career Milestone Tracking System Responses 
A trend analysis will be performed on the ARGUS data described in Chapter III. 
One way this project attempts to measure the effectiveness of CSP in overcoming the 
additional rigors of sea duty is through the empirical analysis of the results taken from 
selected questions on the Navy’s ARGUS Career Milestone Tracking System.  
NAVADMIN 239/03 describes ARGUS as “a retention survey system designed to 
improve the understanding of key factors that influence retention decisions such as 
working conditions, military culture, leadership, training, pay and benefits.” (Chief of 
Naval Operations, 2003) For this analysis, this project presents the change in the average 
response to six questions identified in Chapter III that illustrate individuals’ views on 
their job satisfaction and the influence of certain pays, including CSP, on their 
willingness to remain in the Navy.  The analysis explores if the increase in CSP in 2002 
positively affects the willingness of personnel within each of three pay-grade groups to 
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stay in the Navy.  These groups are E1 to E3, E4 to E6, and E7 to E9.  The survey results 
are beneficial since they provide direct evidence of the financial effect of different 
compensation and quality-of-life changes on an individuals’ retention decision. 
2. Prescribed Sea Tour Extensions 
Chapter II suggests that one way to measure the effectiveness of the CSP program 
is to look at the number of individuals who have exceeded their PST. Comparing this to 
the change in real value of CSP, it is anticipated that CSP will have some influence on an 
individual’s decision to complete and extend their time at sea. A graphical trend analysis 
will be performed for calendar years 2000 to 2006 using the data in Appendix B.  The 
graphs provide a visual representation of the number of individuals who exceeded their 
PST Navy-wide and for each of our five selected ratings of interest. With these graphs a 
comparison can be made between the yearly trend of those individuals who have 
exceeded their PST and the trend of the real value of CSP and CSPP during the same 
time period.  External factors that may explain unexpected trends are also examined in an 
attempt to draw conclusions about the efficacy of CSP in performing one of its stated 
functions: to compensate for the arduous nature of sea duty. 
D. STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF DATA SETS 
1.  Merging DMDC and Cost Data 
The process for collecting and aggregating various cost data for the ratings of 
interest and the number of months of sea duty created by rating for fiscal years 2002 
through 2006 is described in Chapter III.  Previous research suggests that this 
determination could be made by examining whether these payments have any significant 
relationship to additional months of sea duty by Sailors (who either extend their current 
service contract or reenlist).  Since additional pays that may encourage prolonging sea 
tours are available to Sailors, the project team attempts to determine their relationship to 
months of sea duty as well.  These pays are additional salary received from advancing in 
pay grade and bonus payments offered for signing reenlistment contracts extending 
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service for more than three years.  While Chapter II explains that these four pays are not 
the only influence on a Sailor’s individual decision to remain at sea, they constitute a cost 
to the Navy that is large enough that the project team expects to see a positive return from 
these expenditures.   
To measure this return, the months generated by extension and reenlistment must 
be compared to the relevant costs.  While individuals choosing either option are eligible 
for CSP, CSPP, and advancement differentials, only those reenlisting are eligible for SRB 
payments. For this project, the project team considers months of sea duty generated by 
either extension or reenlistment to be dependent on the relevant pay amounts expended in 
the given year for a given rating.  Each rating has five observations for each dependent 
variable, one each for fiscal year 2002 through 2006.  Since five observations is a small 
sample, the project team attempted to merge observations from the ratings of interest that 
are considered sea-intensive (BM, FC, and OS) and those that are considered shore-
intensive (CTI and MA).  This would mean that each dependent variable has up to 15 
observations for sea-intensive ratings and 10 observations for shore-intensive ratings.  If 
the data sets can not be pooled together, they will be considered independently. 
To test the appropriateness of pooling these observations, a statistical analysis to 
verify the distribution of the data among the ratings is performed.  For two ratings to be 
pooled together, the population means of two available parameters, pay grade and months 
of service, must be statistically equal.  Since the population size of each rating is large, a 
sample will be taken.  This sample will consist of 500 random data points from each 
 rating for each parameter where 100 data points are taken from each year being 
considered in the project’s statistical analysis (2002-2006).  For each parameter, the 
hypotheses to test are 
:0H  021 =− µµ  
:1H  021 ≠− µµ  
where 1µ  is the population mean of a parameter for one rating and 2µ  is the population 
mean of the same parameter for a second rating.  As it is unlikely that the variances of 
each parameter for each rating population are equal, the unequal-variances test statistic is 
 52
calculated.  This is derived from the sampling distribution from Equation 5 (Keller, 
2005).  The test statistic is compared to the critical two-tail test statistic at the 10 percent 
significance level using the p-value method.  The p-value is the probability of observing a 
test statistic of the same value or greater given that the null hypothesis, H0, is true (Keller, 
2005).  In this case, if the p-value is greater than 0.1, we are unable to reject the null 
hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis, H1, and the means are considered equal.  
 
 














































where x  = Sample mean, 2s = Sample variance, n = Sample size, and ν  = Number of 
degrees of freedom of the test statistic. 
Equation 5. Test Statistic for Difference in Population Means with Unequal 
Variances 
 
2. Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient Test 
Although each aggregated observation of months generated and all pays are taken 
from the entire population, since there are only 15 and 10 aggregate observations from 
sea-intensive and shore-intensive ratings, respectively, the use of techniques that assume 
normal distributions would not be proper for this portion of the analysis.  Consequently, 
this project will use a non-parametric technique to explore if there is a statistical 
relationship between our dependent variables and the independent costs of CSP, CSPP, 
advancement, and SRB payments.  This technique is the Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient.  Unlike a standard correlation measurement, this technique attempts to 
determine if a relationship between data sets exists by utilizing the ranks of the values 
within each data set rather than the absolute values of the data themselves (Keller, 2005). 
To perform this test, two sets of data are compared.  One set is the hypothesized 
dependent variable, y, which for all cases in this analysis will be months of sea duty 
generated.  The second set is the hypothesized independent variable, x, which will be one 
of the costs proposed to be relevant to generating those months of sea duty.  Within each 
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data set, the relative rank of each value is determined.  Once the ranks are established, the 
sample statistic, rS, for the population Spearman correlation coefficient is calculated per 





r =  
where a and b are the ranks of x and y, respectively, sab is the covariance of the ranks and 
sa and sb are the standard deviations. 
Equation 6. Sample Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient 
  
This project hypothesizes that there should be a positive relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables.  Therefore, the two hypotheses to be tested are 
:0H  0=Sρ  
:1H  0>Sρ  
where Sρ  is the population Spearman correlation coefficient.  To determine whether the 
value of rS is large enough to reject the null hypothesis, it is compared to critical values of 
the test statistic for one-tail tests at various levels of significance, commonly denoted by 
α  (Keller, 2005).  These critical values are published in statistical texts when the number 
of observations is less than 30, as is the case for this project (Keller, 2005).  If the null 
hypothesis can be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis, it can be concluded that 
there is a positive relationship between months of sea duty generated and the costs 
proposed to be relevant to generating those months of sea duty that is significant, 
confirming this project’s stated hypothesis.  The p-value method will be utilized to 
determine the probability that the null hypothesis is true. 
While this test indicates the presence of a relationship, it does not measure the 
magnitude of that relationship.  The magnitude can be determined through linear 
regression techniques.  Consequently, for any cost variable indicating a positive  
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relationship with months of sea duty generated for a given data set, a linear regression 
will be performed to calculate the cost of generating additional months of sea duty using 
that method of payment. 
3. Linear Regression 
Regression analysis is used to predict the value of one dependent variable based 
on the value of other independent variables (Keller, 2005).  When there is only one 
independent variable, the simple linear regression model is used.  This model is 
represented by Equation 7.  To estimate the values of the coefficients in the model, the 
values obtained from this project’s data set are used.  The estimators are found by 
drawing a straight line through the sample data that minimizes the sum of the squared 
differences between the points and the line (Keller, 2005). 
 
εββ ++= xy 10  
where y = Dependent variable, x = Independent variable, 0β  = y-intercept, 1β = Slope, 
and ε  = Error variable. 
Equation 7. Simple Linear Regression Model 
  
Once the least squares line has been constructed the results are assessed to test the 
fit of the line to the data.  This is accomplished by performing a t-test on the estimate of 
 the slope of the line.  The null hypothesis for this test is that there is no linear 
relationship, meaning that the slope is zero.  Thus, the hypotheses to be tested are 
:0H  01 =β  
:1H  01 ≠β  
To test the hypothesis, a test statistic is compared to a critical t-value at a specified 
significance level.  The test statistic is calculated using Equation 8.  The p-value method 






bt β−=  2−= nν  
where b1 = Estimate of slope, 
1b
s = Standard error estimate of b1, n = Number of data 
points, and ν  = Number of degrees of freedom of the test statistic 
Equation 8. Test Statistic for Slope of Regression Model 
 
If more than one independent variable shows a positive relationship with the 
dependent variable from the results of the Spearman test, a multiple linear regression 
model will be used.  The multiple regression model is similar to the simple linear 
regression model except that there are more independent variables and related 
coefficients.  The goodness of fit of the model is tested in a manner similar to the method 
described above. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY   
This chapter describes the path this project will pursue to analyze the data 
gathered in Chapter III.  By utilizing numerous sets of data, the project attempts to take 
an all-around approach to draw a conclusion regarding the viability and effectiveness of 
the Career Sea Pay program as a compensating wage.  The following chapter uses the 
techniques described above to analyze the accumulated data. 
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 V. ANALYSIS 
A.  CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter utilizes the data described in Chapter III and applies the methods 
outlined in Chapter IV in an attempt to identify key trends in the value of CSP and 
whether that pay affects willingness to perform sea duty.  First, historical trends in the 
real dollar value of sea pay are presented to demonstrate the effect of inflation on CSP 
purchasing power.  This analysis is augmented by a brief discussion of the hourly 
compensation rate for time spent underway.  Second, empirical analysis of survey data 
and sea tour completion rates is conducted to infer the response of Sailors to the change 
in sea pay value.  Finally, a statistical analysis is undertaken to determine if various forms 
of compensation have any relationship to the generation of sea duty through extension or 
reenlistment. 
B. INFLATION AND THE REAL VALUE OF CAREER SEA PAY 
1. Purchasing Power Trends for Career Sea Pay 
To accurately compare dollar values across time, the CPI-U has been selected as 
the economic instrument to convert nominal dollar values to a constant base year 
purchasing power. As depicted in Figure 4, the CPI-U has steadily risen every year from 
1983 to 2006. The rate of increase over this 24 year period has averaged 3.125 percent. 
Congressional lawmakers have passed an increase in base pay every year for the past ten 
years so that the purchasing power for each rank and rate remains comparable over time. 
As an example, this trend can be seen in the monthly base pay for an E-5 over six CYS in 
Figure 5. This upward trend in base pay is similar, but not precisely the same rate as 
inflation during the same time. Lawmakers can not ensure base pay increases are at 
exactly the same rate as inflation due to the timeframe of when the CPI-U is calculated. 
As mentioned in Chapter IV, CPI data is determined once the year has ended while base 
pay and sea pay are calculated and passed into law in the previous fiscal year through the 
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Defense Authorization Act. Also, there is a political aspect to military pay.  When 
President George W. Bush took office in 2001, he made it a priority to increase the 
compensation of members of the armed forces at a higher rate than inflation.  
Consequently, a mid-year change in the military pay tables was enacted in June, 2001.  
With the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, there was also an effort to improve military 








































   
 



















Figure 5.   Monthly Base Pay for E-5 Over 6 CYS, 1997-2006 (2006 Dollars)  
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While base pay has had a yearly increase over the past ten years, there has not 
been a change in the Career Sea Pay program since October, 2001. Since that change, 
overall prices have risen 12 percent. This results in the continual decline in the 
purchasing power of CSP. The financial incentive in the form of a compensating wage 
that the CSP program offers Sailors to remain at sea-based commands will continue to 
diminish as the real value of CSP declines each year. Since the revision in sea pay in 
1988, sea pay for an E-5 over five and six CYSD has remained unchanged as shown in 
Figure 6. Adjusted for inflation, this equals a reduction in purchasing power of 38 percent 
over an 18 year period. Figure 6 also illustrates the disparity among the different CYSD. 
From 1989 through 2001, there was a substantial incentive for an E-5 over four CYSD at 
the end of his PST to extend. By extending an extra year and achieving five CYSD, his 
sea pay increased by an average of $195 per month. The $195 may not seem large in 
absolute terms, but it accounts for an 85 percent increase in sea pay. However, the 
incentive to extend for an E-5 with five CYSD to achieve six CYSD is greatly reduced. 




















Figure 6.   Sea Pay Comparison for an E-5 with Over 4, 5, and 6 CYSD (2006 
Dollars) 
 
Without an increase in sea pay for an E-5 over six CYSD in 18 years, the monthly 
purchasing power (in 2006 dollars) has dropped from $528 in 1989 to $325 in 2006, a 38 
percent decrease. While this is a reduction of purchasing power of only $203, it also 
needs to be considered in relation to base pay. As shown in Figure 7, sea pay was 28 
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percent of base pay for an E-5 with six years of service in 1989. Since 1989, sea pay has 
steadily declined to a low of 14 percent of base pay in the most recent year, 2006. The 
change in payouts in the CSP program in 2001 did resolve the disparity for an E-5 over 
four CYSD, but it still did not address the steady decline in sea pay for an E-5 over five 
and six CYSD. Normalizing the value of sea pay in 2001 for the E-5 over four CYSD did 
have the effect of reducing the incentive to extend that had been present from 1989 
through 2001.  The trends described above for an E-5 are comparable for an E-4 as 
shown in Figure 8. 
As the purchasing power of CSP declines, its value as an effective compensating 
wage similarly declines.  If completing additional sea duty is a decision made at the 
margin, the marginal cost is the additional rigor and stress induced by performing sea 
duty as opposed to going to shore duty or exiting the Navy for the civilian sector.  While 
this cost could decline in the future with quality-of-life and technological improvements, 
very few ships have experienced such changes over the past five years.  “Smart ship” 
initiatives to reduce manning and improve automation of tasks are still in the testing stage 
of development.  Additionally, only one new ship class (LPD 17) has entered the fleet 
since 2001.  Thus, as the marginal benefit, namely CSP, is reduced by a loss of 
purchasing power, the number of personnel willing to perform sea duty is lowered with 
the loss in real benefit generated by the 2001 change in sea pay rates enacted in 2001.  
The following sections will use empirical analysis and statistical techniques to test 







































































Figure 8.   Sea Pay as a Percentage of Base Pay for an E-4 Over 4 CYSD (2006 
Dollars) 
 
2. Hourly Rate of Career Sea Pay 
The previous section showed that the real value of CSP has declined both in 
absolute value and as a percentage of base pay since the last change to the CSP table at 
the beginning of fiscal year 2002.  Another way to illustrate the value of CSP as a 
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compensating wage for the performance of sea duty is to calculate the hourly pay 
increase provided to Sailors.  The hourly rate represents the premium the Navy assigns to 
the increased difficulty and stress of being at sea.  Some compensating factors included in 
this premium are temporary separation from family and higher operational tempo 
requiring Sailors to stand rotating watches.  Essentially, CSP is added pay meant to 
compensate for the added costs of performing sea duty. 
The hourly wage rates presented in Table 9 represent CSP as compensation by 
dividing the value of CSP payments by the total additional hours the Navy expects 
Sailors to work at sea using a “best-case” scenario that was explained in Chapter IV.  In 
summary, that scenario assumes that Sailors are underway 25 days each quarter at the end 
of the quarter and that they work the standard Navy workweek underway over a six-day 
week while earning an eight percent annual return on their CSP payments.  Economic 
theory states that a product (in this case labor) will be supplied until (perceived) cost 
equals wage.  Therefore, these hourly rates are indicative of the value the Navy assigns to 
the additional costs for Sailors performing sea duty.  Although it is beyond the scope of 
this project to analyze individual preferences of Sailors, it is interesting to note that for 
the most junior personnel, the value of CSP is significantly less than the federal minimum 
wage of $5.15 per hour that has been in effect during the time period studied.  The 
disparity in the value of the hourly wage between pay grade and seniority suggests that 
satisfaction with sea pay will likely increase over time as the benefits obtained from 
performing sea duty increase.  Consequently, the benefit of CSP as an incentive to remain 
in a sea duty billet or remain in the Navy may not be significant, especially for those 





(Years) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
E-1 <1 $1.19 $1.16 $1.13 $1.09 $1.06
<1 $1.19 $1.16 $1.13 $1.09 $1.06
>2 $1.78 $1.74 $1.69 $1.64 $1.59
<1 $1.19 $1.16 $1.13 $1.09 $1.06
>2 $2.37 $2.32 $2.26 $2.19 $2.12
2 to 4 $3.80 $3.71 $3.62 $3.50 $3.39
4 to 8 $6.88 $6.73 $6.55 $6.34 $6.14
>8 $9.25 $9.05 $8.81 $8.52 $8.26
4 to 5 $7.12 $6.96 $6.78 $6.56 $6.35
6 to 7 $7.71 $7.54 $7.34 $7.10 $6.88
>8 $10.68 $10.44 $10.17 $9.84 $9.53
6 to 7 $7.71 $7.54 $7.34 $7.10 $6.88
9 to 11 $11.03 $10.79 $10.51 $10.16 $9.85
16 to 18 $12.46 $12.18 $11.86 $11.48 $11.12
8 to 9 $11.63 $11.37 $11.07 $10.71 $10.38
12 to 13 $12.34 $12.06 $11.75 $11.37 $11.01
>16 $14.24 $13.92 $13.56 $13.12 $12.71
10 to 11 $11.87 $11.60 $11.30 $10.93 $10.59
14 to 16 $13.64 $13.34 $12.99 $12.57 $12.18
>18 $14.71 $14.38 $14.01 $13.55 $13.13
12 to 13 $12.34 $12.06 $11.75 $11.37 $11.01
14 to 16 $14.71 $14.38 $14.01 $13.55 $13.13











Table 9.   Hourly CSP Compensation Rates (2006 Dollars) 
 
C. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
1. ARGUS Career Milestone Tracking System Survey Responses 
One useful measure of the effectiveness of CSP is the response to questions from 
the Navy’s ARGUS Career Milestone Tracking System survey. As described in Chapter 
III, Sailors complete an online questionnaire at various career milestones.  The responses 
indicate the influence of various quality-of-life and compensation issues on individuals’ 
decision to stay in the Navy or exit.  Respondents rate each issue on a scale of one to 
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seven, where one indicates a strong desire to leave the service, four indicates the issue 
has no effect on their decision, and seven indicates a strong desire to remain in the 
service.  Due to ARGUS system limitations, data can be separated into only two time 
periods; yearly trends cannot be examined.  The change over these two time periods is 
still of interest because it is possible to see the effect of increases in base pay and CSP as 
operational tempo increased after the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Each 
survey question from Table 6 of Chapter III is analyzed in the following paragraphs. 











After 21 August 2003
Before 21 August 2003
 
Figure 9.   Satisfaction with the Number of Hours Put in at Sea to Get the Job Done 
 
Figure 9 reports the results from of the ARGUS survey question response to the 
effect of the number of hours put in at sea to get the job done on retention over the two 
time periods. The hours required to get the job done at sea relates to quality-of-life and 
job satisfaction issues that will impact future career decisions. Hours worked while at sea 
are expected to be longer and more arduous than the hours worked in port or on shore 
duty.  If CSP is an effective compensating wage, we would expect the results of this 
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question to be similar to the results of the question shown in Figure 10, the satisfaction 
with the number of hours put in while in port to get the job done.  
In fact, the trends are reversed.  For all pay grade groups, respondents indicate 
that the number of hours required is an influence to leave the Navy both while at sea and 
in port.   While at sea, the satisfaction with hours worked increases with seniority while 
the opposite is true while in port.  This is consistent with the analysis presented in Section 
B.2 of this chapter.  The marginal benefit of CSP, even after the increase in fiscal year 
2002, does not compensate for the perceived marginal cost of being at sea in the more 
junior pay grades.  While the gap in satisfaction between hours at sea and hours in port 
for these junior personnel has reduced, it is likely to persist with the continued loss of 
CSP purchasing power combined with inflation adjusted base pay.  If the gap did not 
close when the real value of CSP was at its maximum, as inflation continues to erode its 
real value, CSP will be unable to create equality between satisfaction at sea and 
satisfaction in port in the future.  In the more senior pay grades, the value of CSP appears 
to better compensate for the additional work required while at sea.   
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After 21 August 2003
Before 21 August 2003
 
Figure 11.   Satisfaction with the Number of Hours Put in on an Average Day to Get 
the Job Done 
 
Figure 11 reports the results from of the ARGUS survey question response on the 
number of hours put in on an average day to get the job done over the two time periods. 
Respondents to this question include personnel serving both on sea duty and shore duty.  
The higher overall average value of the response to this question when compared to the 
responses in Figures 9 and 10 indicates that respondents on shore duty are more satisfied 
with the number of hours they work than their counterparts at sea.  For CSP and CSPP to 
encourage extension of sea duty or back-to-back sea tours in lieu of going to shore duty, 
their combined value would have to compensate for this difference in satisfaction.  The 
gap narrowed between the average values of the responses in Figure 9 compared to 
Figure 11 during the period after August 21, 2003.  Based on these results, there may be a 
marginal effect for individuals that may have a preference for being at sea to extend their 
term at sea; however, analysis conducted for this project suggests that the perceived value 
of CSP and CSPP will have to increase to effectively encourage personnel to remain at 
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sea beyond their commitment.  This analysis appears to be supported by the following 
examination of the change in Sailors’ satisfaction with their compensation. 
 











After 21 August 2003
Before 21 August 2003
 
Figure 12.   Satisfaction with the Amount of Pay Received 
 
Figures 12, 13, and 14 show the average values of the influence of total pay, base 
pay, and sea pay, respectively, on the respondents’ decision to remain in the Navy.  Total 
pay includes all regular and special pays as well as benefits.  For all pays over all pay 
grades, there was an increase in the level of satisfaction with compensation after August 
21, 2003.  For pay grades above E-4 in the second time period, all pays contributed to a 
desire to stay in the Navy.  The fact that the level of satisfaction with a pay amount 
increases with its magnitude indicates the survey respondents were answering rationally 
from an economic perspective.  As discussed in Chapter II, compensation expectations 
contribute to retention decisions.  The more positive the level of satisfaction an individual 
has for amount of compensation, the greater the chance that individual will be retained.  
The change in the level of satisfaction over time suggests that compensation is becoming 
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more effective at encouraging retention.  Comparing sea pay satisfaction with satisfaction 
with hours worked at sea reveals additional information. 
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Figure 13.   Satisfaction with the Amount Base Pay Received 
 
For all pay grade groups, the respondents were more positive about the amount of 
sea pay they receive than the number of hours they have to work at sea to get the job 
done.  Like the responses in Figure 9, the level of satisfaction with sea pay increases with 
seniority.  Those in pay grades E-4 and above have been influenced to stay in the Navy 
by the amount of sea pay since August 21, 2003.  This is encouraging since a pay should 
intuitively encourage personnel to remain in the Navy to be effective.  The fiscal year 
2002 increase in CSP was successful in achieving this criterion for personnel in pay 
grades above E-3.  Yet, as discussed throughout this paper, the benefits of CSP that 
encourage retention should offset the negative influences of being at sea, i.e. the number 
of hours worked, for the pay to be effective.  Comparing the satisfaction levels reported 
in Figure 9 and Figure 14, the only satisfaction scores that average to a value above 4.00, 
creating a net satisfaction with sea duty that makes a Sailor at least indifferent when 
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making a retention decision, is for those personnel in pay grades E-7 and above.  For 
those in pay grades below E-7, while satisfaction in both the amount of sea pay received 
and the number of hours worked increased over the two time periods, the benefit created 
by the amount of pay is still not enough to offset one of the perceived costs incurred by 
sea duty.  This suggests that CSP has not met its objective to compensate for the rigor of 
sea duty for a large segment of the enlisted community. 
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Figure 14.   Satisfaction with the Amount of Sea Pay Received 
 
2. Prescribed Sea Tours Completion Trend Analysis 
The Military Personnel Manual (1306-116) defines a PST as a sea tour length 
designated for each community as promulgated by the most current sea/shore rotation 
NAVADMIN message. Normally, these sea tours do not exceed five years and most 
times must be at least three years in duration (Chief of Naval Personnel, 2007a).  In 
Chapter II, it was suggested that one way to measure CSP program effectiveness over 
time is by looking at trend of the number of individuals who have exceeded their PST. 
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Remaining at sea is a voluntary action.  The largest additional benefit to remaining at sea 
is the additional compensation from CSP.  Comparing this to CSP payment amounts over 
time should indicate the influence of CSP on personnel performing sea duty and their 
willingness to remain at sea. The number of personnel who exceeded their PST for each 
















































































Figure 18.   Personnel Exceeding PST 2000-2006 (OS Rating) 
 
Figure 15 illustrates the trend of Navy wide enlisted members who have exceeded 
their PST. Figures 16 through 18 illustrate the trend of personnel in the three sea-
intensive ratings (BM, FC, and OS) chosen for this project who exceeded their PST.  All 
of the groups follow the same general pattern, suggesting that something affecting all of 
these ratings is causing this uni-modal trend.  Similar to the pay trends in Figures 7 and 8, 
the number of personnel who exceeded their PST peaked during the calendar years 2001 
and 2002.  This peaking behavior result provides some evidence of a relationship 
between the purchasing power of CSP and the willingness of personnel to remain at sea 
beyond the required duration.  As postulated above, the increase in the real value of CSP 
should have a marginal effect on the willingness of the enlisted population to stay at sea.  
For those at or near an indifference point, the increase in real compensation for sea duty 
will create an increasing net utility of performing that duty, inducing more people to 
volunteer to extend their time at sea.  While this trend is like the one found by Golding 
and McArver (2002) after the increase in CSP in 1988, the rather rapid decline in the 
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number of personnel exceeding their PST after 2002 suggests other factors may have 
influenced the trend displayed in Figures 15 through 18. 
Analysis of the effect of CSP on PST extension rates is hampered by external 
events that occurred contemporaneously to the increase in CSP rates.  The terrorist 
attacks on the United States happened on September 11, 2001. The Navy, along with the 
other services and many agencies, increased their security requirements. Daily routines, 
work schedules, and unit operation tempos all increased temporarily to accommodate this 
new security environment.  This may have prevented timely transfer of personnel 
assigned to operational ships as they were away from homeport supporting homeland 
defense.  Another possible explanation is the increased sense of duty that personnel may 
have felt after the 2001 terrorist attacks. The increase in personnel exceeding their PST 
could be a result of individuals extending their sea tours out of a sense of patriotism and a 
desire to be deployed to a combat theater rather than a shore duty within the United 
States. These are likely additional explanations for the trends indicated in Figures 15 
through 18.  Without interview or survey data, these hypotheses cannot be tested. 
Figure 19 illustrates the trend of personnel in the CTI rating who have exceeded 
their sea tour equivalent (typically a shore tour outside the continental United States). 
This rating can be treated as a control group to judge the influence of CSP on PST 
extension rates.  The CTI rating does not have a sea-duty PST and personnel in that rating 
do not receive CSP while assigned to their equivalent sea tour, which is normally a shore 
tour outside the continental United States.  It is therefore expected that the equivalent sea 
tour extension trend for the CTI rating will have little relationship to the trend in the real 
value of CSP over the period 2000 to 2006.  It follows that if the distribution of CTI 
personnel exceeding their equivalent sea tour is similar to the trends exhibited by the sea-
intensive ratings, CSP is not an explanatory cause for the trend in the sea-intensive 
ratings.  The distribution of the number of personnel of the CTI rating who exceeded their 
PST is bi-modal, with peaks in 2000 and 2002.  The sea-intensive ratings have uni-modal 
distributions similar to the Navy-wide distribution.  The difference in distributions 
provides some evidence of an influence of CSP on the rate at which people exceed their 
PST; however, the small number of CTI personnel in the population makes drawing a 
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definite conclusion unwise.  Except for the decrease of four people exceeding their sea-



















Figure 19.   Personnel Exceeding Sea Tour Equivalent 2000-2006 (CTI Rating) 
 
Figure 20 presents the trend of personnel in the MA rating who have exceeded 
their sea tour equivalent.  For the MA rating, a sea tour equivalent is either a sea tour or 
an overseas shore tour.  Since some of those in the MA rating were assigned to ships at 
the time of the CSP rate change, the project team hypothesizes that if CSP had an 
influence on willingness to exceed the PST, the MA trend should be similar to the sea-
intensive ratings’ trend.  The number of personnel in the MA rating who exceeded their 
assigned sea tour peaked in 2002 calendar year and dropped to zero by 2004, which is 
similar to the trends in Figures 15 through 18.  Thus, there is evidence to suggest a 
relationship between the value of CSP and the willingness to exceed the PST.  It is also 
possible that the 2002 increase in the number of personnel exceeding the PST could be 
attributed to the Navy’s increased security requirements after the September, 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks, especially on ships and in overseas bases.  As the Navy built the MA end 
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strength from 1,500 to 8,000 active personnel, Master-at-Arms already assigned to these 





















Figure 20.   Personnel Exceeding Sea Tour Equivalent 2000-2006 (MA Rating) 
 
3.  Annual CSP and CSPP Costs Data Trend Analysis 
Figure 21 shows the trend of CSP and CSPP payment amounts over a seven year 
period beginning with the year 2000. The most recent CSP and CSPP rate changes went 
into effect at the beginning of calendar year 2002.  As explained in Chapter II, CSP is 
meant to efficiently target manpower dollars to improve the retention of personnel in sea-
service skills.  One way to verify its effectiveness is through an analysis comparing the 
number of personnel, by year, serving sea duty to the CSP payment amount trend. If CSP 
is effective at improving the retention of personnel in sea-service skills, it is expected that 
number of personnel serving sea duty should be consistent over the years. 
Figure 22 is the trend, by percentage, of personnel serving sea duty for each of the 
five ratings of interest. Comparing the number of personnel serving sea duty to the yearly 
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CSP payment amounts, the percentage for most ratings is relatively consistent over the 
selected time period. The variation in the MA rating is a result of the large number of 
conversions and accessions of personnel to that rating as force protection requirements, 
particularly at shore-based facilities, were strengthened.  For the sea-intensive ratings, the 



























   
















































































Figure 22.   Sea Duty Trends of Five Selected Ratings of Interest. 
 
The Navy has been unable to achieve that ratio for the FC rating.  The percentage 
of those assigned to the FC rating declined from over 60 percent to approximately 55 
percent over the period 2001 through 2006.  This indicates that CSP and CSPP have been 
less effective at encouraging sea duty for this rating group.  In response to this declining 
trend, the Navy recently started a pilot program to address the “at-sea manning 
challenges” of specific ratings, including the FC rating, by encouraging the voluntary 
extension of sea duty beyond the PST and the early return to sea duty from shore duty 
(Chief of Naval Personnel, 2007b).  The program, called Sea Duty Incentive Pay, 
provides a lump sum payment based on a monthly rate of $500 to $700 per month 
extended past their PST or Project Rotation Date, whichever is later (Chief of Naval 
Personnel, 2007b).  Given that these rates are higher than current CSP and CSPP rates for 
all but the most senior enlisted personnel, the implementation of this program supports 
our analysis that increasing the real value of CSP and CSPP has some influence on the 




marginal and short-lived effect.  The next section uses statistical analysis to support the 
empirical analysis and tests for a relationship that allows the Navy to determine the cost 
of an additional month of sea duty. 
D. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
1. Pooling Data Sets 
Prior to measuring the relationship between various pays and the number of 
months of sea time generated by extension and reenlistment, the similarity of the project 
chosen ratings’ populations is determined.  Since the pays being examined are based on 
pay grade and various measures of service time, the mean and standard deviation of these 
parameters are calculated from a random sample as described in Chapter IV.  The results 
from this sample are presented in Table 10.   
While the mean pay grade of each rating is E-5, examining the mean service time 
shows a difference among the ratings.  The average service time for the CTI, FC, and OS 
ratings are all under eight years while the MA and BM ratings are greater than eight 
years.  The average Boatswain Mate has been in the Navy for close to 10.5 years.  These 
differences suggest two differences among the ratings.  First, a lower average service 
time with a similar average pay grade indicates that personnel within the CTI, FC, and 
OS ratings tend to advance faster than the other two.  This may be due to the technical 
nature of these ratings.  The skills personnel acquire in these ratings are likely more 
sought after in the civilian sector.  That would generate a higher turnover, allowing for 
higher advancement rates.  Second, the length of service for the BM rating when 
compared to other sea-intensive ratings indicates that there may be a selection bias by the 
personnel who choose to be Boatswain Mates.  If the average Boatswain Mate serves for 
a longer period of time than those in ratings with similar sea-shore rotations, it may be 
because Sailors choosing to become Boatswain Mates do so because they enjoy life at 
sea.  If this is true, they may be inclined to remain at sea regardless of the amount of 
incentives offered to them.  This would also limit the opportunity of those in lower pay 
grades to advance since fewer Boatswain Mates are leaving the service.  Although a 
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cursory inspection of the results in Table 10 reveals that the rating populations differ, a 
statistical pair-wise comparison of the parameter means is performed to verify the general 
results. 
 
BM CTI FC MA OS
Mean 5.202 5.01 5.008 4.908 4.872
Std. Dev. 1.1593 1.1457 1.3445 1.5272 1.4765
Mean 125.084 90.142 92.17 101.4 96.278








Table 10.   Measures of Central Location and Variability for Pay Grade and Service 
Time 
 
Table 11 shows the results of a test for inequality between the means of the pay 
grade and service time for samples from sets of two ratings.  Since the authors’ intent is 
to keep sea-intensive ratings and shore-intensive ratings separate to explore if CSP and 
CSPP have different levels of cost-effectiveness among those groups, sea-intensive 
ratings were not compared with shore-intensive ratings in this test.  A p-value less than 
0.1 indicates that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the populations means are 
different.  For this project to pool data sets from different ratings, the population means 
for both parameters need to be equal, indicating that the general composition of pay grade 
and service time is similar.  Therefore, to conclude that the populations are similar, the p-
values for both parameters being compared must be greater than 0.1.  The only pair-wise 
comparison that meets this requirement is the FC-OS group.  As discussed above, these 
ratings are similar in their technical level whereas the other groups are not.  From this 
analysis, only the FC and OS rates can be analyzed as a group; the other ratings will be 
measured separately.  The impact of this on future statistical analyses will be the large 
influence one data point can have on an entire data set given the small number of data 



















t-Statistic 2.44361 7.11128 3.93088 6.00038 1.5229 0.88853 1.19468 -2.58504
p-Value 0.01472 2.2E-12 9.1E-05 2.8E-09 0.1281 0.37447 0.23252 0.00988
Equal Means? NO NO NO NO YES YES YES NO
Pool Data?
BM-FC BM-OS FC-OS CTI-MA
NO NO YES NO  
 
Table 11.   Statistical Determination of Similarity of Rating Populations 
 
2. Spearman Rank Correlation Test Analysis 
The first procedure this project uses to infer a statistical relationship between 
compensation from various additional and special pays and the creation of additional sea 
duty from retention is a non-parametric correlation technique.  It is expected that any 
additional compensation available to an individual will have a positive influence on his or 
her desire to remain in the organization offering the compensation.  The decision to 
remain will depend on whether the compensation offered adequately compensates the 
individual for the effort demanded by the job and on other external factors such as the 
availability of alternative employment and the impact on the individual’s personal affairs.  
When multiple pays have a potential influence on a decision, one of the pays could be 
such an overwhelming influence as to overwhelm the effect of the others.  For example, 
this project expects that selective reenlistment bonus payments would be the primary 
form of compensation influencing the reenlistment decision given that they are paid in 
large, lump sums and the SRB program is used by the Navy for the specific purpose of 
generating reenlistments.  The Spearman rank correlation test measures two variables to 
determine if one has a linear relationship to the other.  In this project, potential pays 
influencing the decision to extend or reenlist are correlated with the number of months of 
sea duty generated by a change in EAOS dates categorized as either an extension or a 




vs. CSP CSPP Advancement CSP CSPP Advancement SRB
Spearman 
Coefficient 0.3 0 0.6 -0.9 -0.4 -0.8 0.8944
P-Value       
(One-Tail) 0.2743 0.5 0.1151 0.0359 0.2119 0.0548 0.0368
Significant 
Positive 
Relationship? NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
Spearman 
Coefficient -0.2848 0.1394 -0.7091 -0.0182 -0.2848 0.297 0.1515
P-Value       
(One-Tail) 0.1964 0.3379 0.0167 0.4783 0.1964 0.1865 0.3247
Significant 
Positive 
Relationship? NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Spearman 
Coefficient 0.8 N/A 0.8 0.5 N/A 0.9 -0.1
P-Value       
(One-Tail) 0.0548 N/A 0.0548 0.1587 N/A 0.0359 0.4207
Significant 
Positive 
Relationship? YES N/A YES NO N/A YES NO
Spearman 
Coefficient 0.8 0.8 -0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.8
P-Value       
(One-Tail) 0.0548 0.0548 0.1587 0.1587 0.1587 0.4207 0.0548
Significant 
Positive 









Table 12.   Spearman Rank Correlation Test Results 
 
Although there are very few relationships that exhibit a significantly positive 
relationship, there are trends which do give some credence to our hypotheses about the 
contribution of various pays to different retention decisions.  With the exception of the 
FC and OS group for CSP and the BM rating for CSPP, CSP and CSPP both have a 
positive influence on the decision to extend on sea duty.  While not significantly positive 
in the case of the BM rating, the small sample size and the effect of the assumption used 
to estimate the value of CSP and CSPP from 2002 to 2004 described in Chapter III 
possibly reduced the strength of the relationship.  The number of months generated by 
extension (presented in Appendix B) declined each year from a high of 18,850 months in 
2002 to a low of 12,284 months in 2006.  This trend is consistent with the reduced real 
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value of CSP and CSPP over that period.  For the FC and OS group, a rather sharp 
decline in the months of sea duty generated in both rating groups in fiscal year 2003 
likely impacted the results of the correlation test due to its methodology.  Since this 
happened in both ratings over the same time period the explanation for this result may be 
due to external factors. 
In fiscal year 2003, the United States commenced operation Iraqi Freedom and 
the Navy began its Fleet Response Plan (FRP).  The FRP increased the operational tempo 
of ships and created more irregular deployment schedules.  For those in technical ratings 
such as OS and FC, these events may have encouraged them to seek alternative 
employment at the end of their contractual obligation.  Given the increasingly robust U.S. 
economy the opportunities for employment in the civilian sector were clearly present.  
Removing the data from 2003 for these ratings illustrates the impact of that year on the 
correlation.  The relationship between CSP and months of sea duty generated goes from 
negative to slightly, yet not significantly, positive, while the Spearman coefficient for 
CSPP becomes significantly positive.  The positive effect of CSPP is expected since, as 
explained in Chapter II, this pay was implemented to encourage those in a sea duty billet 
to extend in order to continue to receive the payment.  CSPP provides an additional 
expected income for remaining at sea since it is only paid to those serving 36 consecutive 
months at sea.  For the shore-intensive ratings, the expected positive relationship is 
present and statistically significant.  The strong positive relationship is noticeable, even 
with the small sample size, possibly because the individuals in these ratings do not 
typically expect to receive these pays. They are not eligible for CSP and CSPP when 
assigned to the shore billets that comprise the majority of their career.  As a result, the 
impact of the additional pay could be a greater influence at a retention decision point than 
for those accustomed to receiving the pay. 
The relationship between the additional pay expended to compensate those Sailors 
advanced while assigned to a sea duty billet and the months of sea duty generated by 
retention is not consistent, except for the CTI rating where the expected relationship 
exists.  The likely source of error is with the decision by this project’s authors to 
aggregate individual data.  For a clear relationship to be evident, individuals eligible for 
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advancement and who expect to receive the additional pay provided by the promotion 
would have to be the same as those who are at a retention decision point in that year.  
Only in this case would the future expectation of higher pay resulting from the 
advancement be a determining influence in the retention decision.  Due to the relatively 
few personnel in the CTI rating assigned to a sea duty billet, there is a greater chance of 
the personnel being advanced being the same as those reaching a retention decision point; 
therefore, the advancement pay differential has a greater influence on the retention 
decision and generates the expected positive relationship. 
The expected positive relationship between months of sea duty generated by 
reenlistment and SRB appears to be present in only three of the four groups, and is only 
significantly positive for the BM and MA ratings.  The relatively few data points make 
analysis problematic.  Furthermore, the number of SRB offers taken compared to the 
average SRB amount presented in Table 13 does not show any particular positive trend.  
There appears to be a number of individual and external factors contributing to the 
acceptance of an SRB besides the amount of the SRB.  This presents a particular 




















2002 0 $0.00 858 $17,466.72 599 $8,289.49 164 $15,642.44 441 $3,333.74
2003 0 $0.00 732 $12,414.45 735 $4,764.44 123 $15,182.02 767 $4,472.00
2004 0 $0.00 357 $12,797.85 808 $5,239.01 73 $14,796.92 1078 $7,575.88
2005 278 $5,001.37 641 $14,176.01 812 $5,480.04 78 $17,768.11 907 $8,390.64
2006 573 $4,261.89 839 $13,627.36 623 $5,088.40 128 $16,634.67 892 $8,162.01
MABM FC OS CTI
 
 
Table 13.   Summary of SRB Data by Rating 2002-2006 
 
The results found using the Spearman correlation test are various and present no 
conclusive evidence as to the effectiveness of CSP and CSPP as a retention tool.  While 
there is some indication that CSP and CSPP may provide an incentive to remain for short 
periods of time, there appears to be no support for sea pay encouraging Sailors to reenlist.  
The SRB program payments seem to be more effective at generating sea duty through 
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reenlistment, though it is clear from the data in Table 13 that the decision to reenlist is 
more than strictly a monetary one.  The following section seeks to determine the cost of 
generating an additional month of sea duty for those pays showing a positive relationship 
to months of sea duty generated. 
3. Simple Linear Regression Analysis 
With the correlation between various forms of compensation and the additional 
sea duty generated determined, the linear regression model is used to determine the cost 
of each additional month generated for a particular payment method.  For each pay that 
exhibited a significant positive linear relationship using the Spearman correlation test, a 
linear regression was performed using the method described in Chapter IV.  The 
regression model provides a coefficient that relates the amount of money spent in a fiscal 
year for a particular pay to the number of months of sea duty generated in the same 
period.  Two statistical measures are used to determine the significance of the coefficient 
and the explanatory power of the model: the p-value and the adjusted R-square.  The 
adjusted R-square value indicates how much of the variability in the data is explained by 
the regression model.  There is no specific acceptability level for this term, though the 
closer the value is to one, the more powerful the model is at explaining the data.  The p-
value will be used to determine if the model is acceptable.  For the value of the 
coefficient to be valid, this project requires the p-value to be less than or equal to 0.1.  
The results of the simple linear regressions performed are summarized in Table 14. 
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BM
Category Reenlist Extend Extend Reenlist Extend Extend Reenlist
Independent 
Variable SRB CSP Advancement Advancement CSP CSPP SRB
Coefficient 
(Months) 8047.004 -5811.33 -422.8831 1431.5148 -5807.71 -3401.71 1064.933
t-Stat 17.9825 -0.6727 -0.1451 3.89159 -1.0228 -0.79655 3.595481
p-Value 0.00038 -0.1451 0.89383 0.03009 0.38169 0.483926 0.03688
Coefficient 
(Months/$) 0.002363 0.208253 0.01988047 0.00319809 0.00652 0.188809 0.000286
t-Stat 6.63615 1.0657 1.34778 1.71782 1.8724 1.94357 5.98509
p-Value 0.00697 0.36472 0.27047 0.18433 0.15788 0.1472 0.00934
Significant at 10% 
Level? YES NO NO NO NO NO YES
F-Stat 0.00697 0.36472 0.27047 0.18433 0.15788 0.1472 0.00934
Adjusted R Square 0.915 0.0328 0.1695 0.3278 0.3852 0.4098 0.897
Cost to Generate 
Additional Month 










Table 14.   Linear Regression Results for Cost Parameters Exhibiting a Positive 
Relationship with Generated Months of Sea Duty 
 
Of the seven regressions performed, only two generated models that had 
independent variable coefficients with p-values less than 0.1.  These two modeled the 
relationship of SRB payments to months generated by reenlistment for the BM and MA 
ratings.  From the adjusted R-square terms, both models explained a significant portion of 
the variability in the data.  The BM model accounted for 91.5 percent of the variability 
while the MA model accounted for 89.7 percent of the data variability.  Both models p-
value indicate the coefficient of the SRB variable is significant at the ten percent level.  
By taking the inverse of the coefficient, the cost of generating one month of sea duty 
from the method can be estimated.  For the BM rating, the cost of an additional month is 
$423.20, while the same month costs $3,491.53 for the MA rating.  Analysis of the 
reason for the large difference is beyond the scope of this project; however, the amounts 
can be related to CSP and CSPP rates.  CSP and CSPP rates are below the MA cost at all 
pay grades and CYSD levels and they are below the BM cost for pay grades and CYSD 
levels of personnel likely making their first reenlistment decision (junior seamen and 
third-class petty officers).  Furthermore, the cost estimated for the BM rating is close to 
the proposed value of $500 to $700 per month proposed by the Navy in its pilot Sea Duty 
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Incentive Pay program (Chief of Naval Operations, 2007).  This provides evidence that 
CSP and CSPP in its current form are not cost-effective if they are expected to serve as a 
reenlistment incentive. 
The results of these models confirm that there are a number of external factors 
that influence the retention decision.  Money is certainly a component, but other non-
pecuniary items contribute to the retention decision.  CSP and CSPP will not impact 
long-term retention decisions, but they may have limited effectiveness for short-term 
extensions while personnel consider their future career path.  Although the regression for 
the relationship of CSP and CSPP to months generated by extension for the MA rating do 
not meet this project’s acceptance criteria, the value of the coefficients provide some 
information.  The CSP cost of $153.38 per month and the CSPP cost of $5.30 per month 
are illustrative of the magnitude of the marginal benefit a person requires to extend.  This 
amount is potentially feasible, as indicated by the implementation of the Sea Duty 
Incentive Program, if the Navy requires a short-term force shaping tool. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter merges the various data collected throughout this project to perform 
a multi-level analysis of the effect and influence of the fiscal year 2002 change in the 
CSP program.  An analysis of the trend in real value of CSP using CPI inflation data 
reveals a decline in the purchasing power of the special pay.  This value represents the 
marginal benefit received by a Sailor performing sea duty.  The marginal cost to the 
Sailor is the value of the extra effort required to perform the additional chores necessary 
at sea.  Empirical analysis of ARGUS survey results and extension of PST trends 
provides some evidence that the recent increase in CSP had a positive effect on both the 
level of satisfaction with CSP and the willingness to remain at sea beyond the prescribed 
tour length.  This positive effect was short-lived as the marginal benefit of the CSP 
increase was eroded to a point below the marginal cost by inflation.  Statistical analysis 
reveals that CSP and CSPP have a much more limited effect on retention.  While there is 
some indication of a positive relationship between the pays and the willingness to extend 
for short periods, the effect is rating-specific and more significant for the shore-intensive 
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ratings studied.  Other targeted pays, such as the Selective Reenlistment Bonus, appear to 
be better at encouraging retention.  Statistical analysis failed to reveal the value Sailors 
place on their time at sea.  This may be a result of the size of the sample used in this 
project or the nature of the individual preferences of Sailors that could not be measured 
by an aggregate analysis.  Chapter VI discusses the implications of these results and 
proposes modifications to the CSP program that will enable it to satisfy its stated intent. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This project’s authors intended to determine if the enlisted component of the 
Navy CSP program is effective at meeting its primary objective of adequately 
compensating Sailors for the unique and arduous nature of sea duty service.  To be 
effective, the authors hypothesized that a positive correlation between a change in the real 
value of CSP expenditures and the attitudes of enlisted Sailors toward performing sea 
duty would exist.  To find the presence of a correlation, various sources of data were 
examined using numerous forms of analysis.  First, the historical trends in the real dollar 
value of sea pay were presented to demonstrate the effect of inflation on the purchasing 
power of the pay.  Second, an empirical analysis of survey data and sea tour extension 
rates was conducted to infer the response of Sailors to the change in sea pay value.  
Finally, a statistical analysis was undertaken to determine if various forms of 
compensation have any relationship to the generation of sea duty through extension or 
reenlistment, indicating the effectiveness of a secondary objective of the program to serve 
as a force-shaping tool.  The results lead this project’s authors to conclude that empirical 
evidence suggests that the increase in CSP rates in fiscal year 2002 generated an increase 
in the willingness to go to sea; however, the increase was short-lived due to the loss in the 
real value of the compensation due to inflation.  Additionally, statistical analysis does not 
consistently verify the relationship between the cost and the intended secondary benefit 
of CSP and is unable to determine individual value of the cost of sea duty.  These results 
raise questions about whether the current structure of the CSP program is effective at 
accomplishing its stated objectives. 
The structure of CSP is similar to base pay in all but one regard.  Like base pay 
rates, CSP rates increase with seniority both in terms of rank and time served in the 
respective duty.  Unlike base pay rates, however, CSP rates are not adjusted annually to 
account for the effect of inflation.  Since CSP is meant to function as a compensating 
wage, it should provide a benefit to a Sailor equal to his or her perceived cost of 
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performing duties required at sea.  If the benefit is equal or greater than the cost, the 
willingness to perform sea duty should increase.  Previous studies indicate such 
willingness can be measured by the change in the rate of Sailors staying in a sea duty 
billet beyond their ordered tour length.  The data in this project establishes that the 
increase in CSP for fiscal year 2002 produced an increase in the rate at which Sailors 
exceeded their prescribed sea tour (PST).  Yet, just like the trend in the real value of CSP 
since then, the rate at which Sailors exceeded their PST declined.  The inability of CSP to 
sustain a marginal benefit equal to compensating for the marginal cost of sea duty is a 
sign that the program is ineffective in its current form. 
Another indication of the ineffectiveness of CSP was found through a review of 
responses by Sailors to questions about quality-of-life issues including their satisfaction 
with the number of hours they work and the amount of various pays.  Comparing these 
responses provides evidence of the efficacy of CSP as a wage compensating for the rigor 
of sea duty.  For all pay grade groups, the respondents were more positive about the 
amount of sea pay they receive than the number of hours they have to work at sea to get 
the job done. Though the trends are similar for both questions in that the degree of 
satisfaction improves with seniority, those above the E-4 pay grade responded that sea 
pay was an influence to stay in the Navy while the number of hours required at sea was 
an influence to leave.  Since working hours are one of the more unpleasant job 
characteristics, the survey results indicate that personnel are apparently not associating 
sea pay with its intended purpose of compensating for the hours of work required at sea.  
Presumably, an individual that feels sea pay is a positive influence would feel that he or 
she is being compensated for the time spent working at sea.  If effective, the hours of 
work required at sea should be less of an influence to leave the Navy.  This therefore 
suggests that CSP is not cost effective at increasing Sailors’ satisfaction with sea duty. 
A second indication of the disconnect Sailors perceive between the cost of sea 
duty and the benefit of CSP is the satisfaction with hours worked at port and at sea.  If 
CSP is an effective compensating wage, this project would expect the survey results of 
the questions concerning hours put in while at sea or in port to be similar. For all pay 
grade groups, respondents indicate that the number of hours required is an influence to 
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leave the Navy both while at sea and in port. While at sea, the satisfaction with hours 
worked increases with seniority while the opposite is true while in port.  The fact that the 
trends are reversed indicates the marginal benefit of CSP, even after the increase in fiscal 
year 2002, does not compensate for the perceived marginal cost of being at sea in the 
more junior pay grades.  This is supported by the hourly wage calculations that show the 
compensation for sea duty provided by CSP is less than the federal minimum wage for 
junior enlisted personnel.  While the trend is improving, the gap in satisfaction between 
hours at sea and hours in port for these junior personnel is likely to persist with the 
continued loss of CSP purchasing power combined with CSP being a smaller percentage 
of base pay.  In the more senior pay grades, the value of CSP appears to better 
compensate for the additional work required while at sea, but satisfaction at sea is still not 
equal to satisfaction while in port.  Incentives like CSP are more effective when they can 
be tied directly to the activity they are compensating.  CSP is paid to any Sailor attached 
to a deployable ship, whether or not it is underway.  By not paying CSP to Sailors only 
when their ship is underway, the Navy obscures the reason the pay is provided and 
arguably reduces its effectiveness. 
The statistical analysis conducted in this project shows that CSPP, which is the 
portion of the CSP program designed to act as an incentive to encourage retention, has 
limited effectiveness for some ratings.  While there is a positive relationship between 
CSPP and months generated by an EAOS change, especially for extensions less than 36 
months, linear regressions provide no significant evidence of the value Sailors assign to 
this compensation. 
In contrast, for SRB payments, a significant positive relationship between the 
amount paid and the months generated as well as a significant regression coefficient is 
found.  SRB payments are targeted to specific ratings and ranks within those ratings to 
achieve the desired manning levels required whereas CSPP is a flat rate paid to any Sailor 
completing 36 consecutive months or more at sea.  Additionally, CSPP suffers from the 
same loss in real value over time since the amount the Navy offers does not change 
annually.  As discussed in Chapter II, retention decisions are made based on the value an 
individual assigns to the factors influencing the retention decision.  Targeted pays like 
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SRB in these cases appear to be more effective at encouraging retention than do pays like 
CSPP, a conclusion reached by sea pay studies conducted in the late 1990’s.  For this 
reason, the project team concludes that the Navy’s efforts at implementing a Sea Duty 
Incentive Pay program that provide lump-sum payments to specific ratings facing sea-
duty shortfalls will be more effective at generating retention than will CSPP in its current 
form.  The Navy’s decision to pursue such a program supports our conclusions regarding 
the effectiveness of the CSP program and the need to align the program’s structure to 
reestablish a useful cost-benefit relationship. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To address the structural flaws in the current CSP program indicated by this 
project’s analysis, two changes to OPNAV Instruction 7220.14 are proposed to increase 
cost-effectiveness.  First, tie the cost of sea duty directly to the benefit provided by CSP.  
CSP should be paid only to Sailors while the ship they are assigned to is away from its 
homeport.  While the ship is in its homeport or in a shipyard, the Sailor would be 
ineligible for CSP since the burdens experienced at sea are not present and the Navy does 
not expect additional hours to be worked in port.  To ensure incentives still exist among 
pay grades, it would be beneficial that the current sea counter tracking system remain in 
place.  Therefore, sea service time will still accumulate for Sailors regardless of whether 
their ship is at sea, in a shipyard, or in its homeport.  Sailors would still accumulate time 
on their sea duty counter and while they are at sea get paid the prorated amount for their 
associated rank and CYSD.  This change would result in immediate savings in CSP 
funds; however the effectiveness will only improve from this change if the savings are 
reapplied to augment the current CSP pay rates.  The CSP rates should be set equal to 
their real value when increased for fiscal year 2002.  The rates must then be increased at 
the same annual rate as the yearly percentage change in base pay.  Without a yearly 
adjustment for inflation, the recommended system will encounter the same trend which 
has occurred since the last change in CSP.  A guaranteed yearly increase ensures the real 
dollar value of the program would remain relatively constant. 
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The second proposed change to the Career Sea Pay instruction, OPNAV 
Instruction 7220.14, is to revamp the CSPP portion of the program.  This requires 
eliminating the current premium payment with a targeted premium focused on ratings 
which the Navy is having difficulty filling the necessary sea duty billets.  The new 
premium would be similar to the Sea Duty Incentive Pay program currently in its pilot 
phase.  The one hundred dollar per month premium has been unchanged since 
implemented in 1989, so the real value of this premium is 37 percent less today than at 
the time of its inception.  In addition, by offering the same premium to all personnel 
regardless of rank or preference for sea duty, the effectiveness of the pay’s ability to 
encourage retention is limited.  The incentive plan currently being tested by the Navy 
addresses many of the concerns in the previous studies reviewed in this project regarding 
incentive pays by directly relating the cost incurred by the program to the benefits 
received by the Navy in the form of additional months of sea duty.  This will be more 
cost-effective for the Navy in the long-run. 
 94
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 95
APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF SEA PAY LEGISLATION1 
 
Act of March 3, 1835, ch. 27, §1, 4 Stat. 755, 755-757 (1835) 
 
• First form of sea pay as it is understood today.   
• Established pay rates for officers that included within grade differentials linked to 
duty status.  
 
Act of June 1, 1860, ch. 67, §1, 12 Stat. 23, 24 (1860) 
 
• Recognized length of cumulative sea time as a pay factor in some officer grades.  
• Prescribed pay steps based on length of sea duty for the grades of Lieutenant, 
Boatswain, Gunner, Carpenter, and Sailmaker.    
 
Act of March 3, 1899, ch. 413, §13, 30 Stat. 1004, 1007 (1899)  
 
• Established differential rates for sea and shore duty. Army officers were the 
benchmark.  
o Navy officers ashore received 15 percent less than Army officers.  
o Navy officers at sea received pay equal to comparable Army officers. 
 
Act of May 13, 1908, ch. 166 [Public Law 115, 60th Congress], §1, 35 Stat. 127, 127-
128 (1908) 
 
• Set pay rates for officers based strictly on grade and length of service, ending 73-
year period of duty status differentials. 
• Established a new special pay for officers assigned to sea equal to 10 percent of 
base pay while performing such duty.  Sea duty pay considered to be “extra” 
compensation. 
 
Act of June 22, 1922, (Joint Service Pay Readjustment Act of 1922) ch. 212, [Public 
Law 235, 67th Congress], §2, 42 Stat. 625, 627 (1922) 
 






                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all data were provided by the Sixth Edition of Military Compensation 
and Background Papers: Compensation Elements and Related Manpower Cost Items: Their Purposes and 




The Act of March 7, 1942, ch. 166 [Public Law 490, 77th Congress], §18, 56 Stat. 143, 
148 (1942) 
 
• Restored sea duty pay provision as a wartime measure and for the first time 
included enlisted personnel within its scope.  
o Provided commissioned officers an additional 10 percent of base pay. 
o Provided warrant officers and enlisted personnel an additional 20 percent 
of base pay. 
 
Pay Readjustment Act of 1942, ch. 413 [Public Law 607, 77th Congress], §2, 56 
Stat. 359, 360 (1942) 
 
• Made sea pay permanent.  
 
 
Hook Commission in 1948 
 
• First study of military compensation since 1908.   
• Recommended abolishing sea pay for officers and modifying sea pay for enlisted 
personnel. 
 
Career Compensation Act of 1949, ch. 681 [Public Law 351, 81st Congress], §206, 63 
Stat. 802, 811 (1949)  
 
• Enacted in response to Hook Commission of 1948 
o Eliminated sea duty pay for officers.  
o Established enlisted personnel sea pay rates ranging from $8 to $22.50 per 
month. 
 
Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1979, Public Law 95-485, 
§804(a)(1), 92 Stat. 1611, 1620-1621 (1978) 
 
• Entitled any enlisted member of a uniformed service in pay grade E-4 or above 
who had served more than three years on “sea duty” to “career sea pay.” 
o Set rates that ranged from a low of $25 a month to a high of $100 a month. 
• Initiated cumulative-years-of-sea-duty categories 
o 1979 and 1980: three categories – over three years, over five years, and 
over twelve. 
o 1981: four categories - over three years, over five years, over seven years, 
and over twelve. 
o 1982: seven categories - - over three years, over five years, over seven 





Military Personnel and Compensation Amendments of 1980, Public Law 96-343, 
§3(a), 94 Stat. 1123, 1124 (1980)  
 
• Increased rates set to become effective in October 1, 1981 by 15 percent and 
made them effective a year earlier. 
o Targeted petty officers with six to twelve years of service due to a 
shortage in these personnel. 
 
Military Pay and Allowances Benefits Act of 1980, Public Law 96-579, §4(a), 94 Stat. 
3359, 3364-3366 (1980) 
 
• Made commissioned officers, except those in pay grades O-1 and O-2 without 
four years of active service as either an enlisted person or a noncommissioned 
warrant officer, to Career Sea Pay (CSP). 
o Amount of pay still depended on pay grade and cumulative years of sea 
duty. 
• Established the Career Sea Pay Premium (CSPP). 
o Entitled payment of an additional $100 a month to any member of the 
uniformed service for each subsequent month serving on sea duty past 36 
consecutive months. 
• Expanded CSP to not only those personnel assigned to ships, but to those assigned 
to either a ship-based staff or ship-based aviation unit when embarked on a ship 
underway. 
 
Uniformed Services Pay Act of 1981, Public Law 97-60, §116, 95 Stat. 989, 996 
(1981) 
 
• Made CSP available to members of the “off-crew” of a two crew submarine. 
 
Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985, Public Law 98-525, §623(a), 98 
Stat. 2492, 2541 (1984) 
 
• Increased pay rates for enlisted members in the pay grades E-6 to E-9. 
• Added four more cumulative-years-of-sea-duty categories for enlisted personnel: 
over 13 years, over 14 years, over 16 years, and over 18 years. 
 
Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986, Public Law 99-145,  §634(a), 99 
Stat. 583, 647 (1985) 
 
• Increased rates for warrant officers in pay grades W-3 and W-4. 
• Applied the four cumulative-years-of-sea-duty categories established for enlisted 
personnel in 1985 to all warrant and commissioned officers. 
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• Removed the prohibition of payment of CSP to officers in pay grades O-1 and O-
2 with less than four years of either active enlisted or noncommissioned service. 
o The Navy would not provide this pay to these members until fiscal year 
2002.  
 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Public 
Law 100-180, §621, 101 Stat. 1019, 1097-1100 (1987)- 
 
• Increased CSP rates for enlisted personnel with more than five years of sea duty. 
• Decreased CSP rates for enlisted personnel with less than five years of sea duty. 
• Increased CSP rates for warrant officers in pay grades W-1, W-2, and W-3 with 
more than nine years of sea duty and warrant officers in pay grade W-4 with more 
than ten years of sea duty. 
• Eliminated CSPP entitlements for enlisted personnel in pay grades above E-4 with 
more than five years of cumulative sea duty.  
 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Public Law 106- 
398, 114 Stat. 1654A-156 
 
• Authorized Service Secretaries to prescribe CSP and CSPP rates and codified 
authorization in Title 37 of the United States Code. 
o Set $750 a month as maximum possible CSP rate. 
o Set $350 a month as maximum possible CSPP rate. 
• Restored CSPP entitlement that was eliminated in 1988 to those in grade E-4 with 
more than five years of cumulative sea duty. 
 
Executive Order 13294, March 28, 2003 
 
• Placed responsibility for carrying out the authority delegated to the President by 
37 U.S.C. §301(a), relevant to career sea pay and other incentive pay, with the 
Secretaries of Commerce, Defense, Health and Human Services, and Homeland 
Defense as those entitlements affect military personnel under the respective 
jurisdiction of those departments. 
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APPENDIX B: DATA SUMMARY 
A. ARGUS RESPONSES 
Before 21 Aug 2003    
Survey Question 1 | 2 | 3 |
Scale Responses | Scale Responses | Scale Responses |
E7 1 71 | E7 1 88 | E7 1 61 |
E7 2 107 | E7 2 113 | E7 2 101 |
E7 3 149 | E7 3 166 | E7 3 173 |
E7 4 226 | E7 4 226 | E7 4 393 |
E7 5 78 | E7 5 89 | E7 5 137 |
E7 6 37 | E7 6 47 | E7 6 80 |
E7 7 12 | E7 7 15 | E7 7 30 |
E8 1 18 | E8 1 19 | E8 1 12 |
E8 2 28 | E8 2 36 | E8 2 40 |
E8 3 49 | E8 3 45 | E8 3 38 |
E8 4 64 | E8 4 61 | E8 4 99 |
E8 5 24 | E8 5 29 | E8 5 49 |
E8 6 5 | E8 6 13 | E8 6 26 |
E8 7 7 | E8 7 4 | E8 7 8 |
E9 1 6 | E9 1 4 | E9 1 5 |
E9 2 8 | E9 2 15 | E9 2 10 |
E9 3 23 | E9 3 24 | E9 3 16 |
E9 4 26 | E9 4 24 | E9 4 51 |
E9 5 10 | E9 5 12 | E9 5 19 |
E9 6 4 | E9 6 6 | E9 6 14 |
E9 7 6 | E9 7 5 | E9 7 9 |
Total 958 | Total 1041 | Total 1371 |
| | |
Wtd Avg 3.465 | Wtd Avg 3.460 | Wtd Avg 3.871 |
  
Survey Question 4 | 5 | 6 |
Scale Responses | Scale Responses | Scale Responses |
E7 1 58 | E7 1 58 | E7 1 46 |
E7 2 111 | E7 2 106 | E7 2 31 |
E7 3 205 | E7 3 185 | E7 3 78 |
E7 4 146 | E7 4 32 | E7 4 81 |
E7 5 382 | E7 5 317 | E7 5 136 |
E7 6 307 | E7 6 241 | E7 6 96 |
E7 7 110 | E7 7 74 | E7 7 49 |
E8 1 13 | E8 1 14 | E8 1 12 |
E8 2 17 | E8 2 26 | E8 2 16 |
E8 3 54 | E8 3 46 | E8 3 16 |
E8 4 40 | E8 4 8 | E8 4 23 |
E8 5 103 | E8 5 87 | E8 5 40 |
E8 6 112 | E8 6 99 | E8 6 42 |
E8 7 45 | E8 7 31 | E8 7 13 |
E9 1 7 | E9 1 8 | E9 1 4 |
E9 2 6 | E9 2 11 | E9 2 6 |
E9 3 23 | E9 3 19 | E9 3 10 |
E9 4 20 | E9 4 2 | E9 4 13 |
E9 5 51 | E9 5 53 | E9 5 23 |
E9 6 57 | E9 6 41 | E9 6 16 |
E9 7 28 | E9 7 21 | E9 7 8 |
Total 1895 | Total 1479 | Total 759 |
| | |
Wtd Avg 4.661 | Wtd Avg 4.555 | Wtd Avg 4.423 |  
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After 21 Aug 2003    
Survey Question 1 | 2  | 3 |
Scale Responses | Scale Responses | Scale Responses |
E7 1 155 | E7 1 184 | E7 1 143 |
E7 2 214 | E7 2 248 | E7 2 255 |
E7 3 321 | E7 3 354 | E7 3 444 |
E7 4 489 | E7 4 514 | E7 4 861 |
E7 5 220 | E7 5 262 | E7 5 468 |
E7 6 118 | E7 6 147 | E7 6 267 |
E7 7 17 | E7 7 37 | E7 7 81 |
E8 1 61 | E8 1 64 | E8 1 57 |
E8 2 62 | E8 2 76 | E8 2 70 |
E8 3 97 | E8 3 112 | E8 3 137 |
E8 4 177 | E8 4 168 | E8 4 301 |
E8 5 65 | E8 5 83 | E8 5 142 |
E8 6 37 | E8 6 55 | E8 6 76 |
E8 7 8 | E8 7 12 | E8 7 17 |
E9 1 14 | E9 1 19 | E9 1 14 |
E9 2 24 | E9 2 27 | E9 2 32 |
E9 3 40 | E9 3 47 | E9 3 50 |
E9 4 69 | E9 4 65 | E9 4 102 |
E9 5 32 | E9 5 39 | E9 5 50 |
E9 6 17 | E9 6 17 | E9 6 39 |
E9 7 2 | E9 7 10 | E9 7 15 |
Total 2239 | Total 2540 | Total 3621 |
| | |
Wtd Avg 3.551 | Wtd Avg 3.600 | Wtd Avg 3.938 |
Survey Question 4 | 5 | 6 |
Scale Responses | Scale Responses | Scale Responses |
E7 1 100 | E7 1 126 | E7 1 106 |
E7 2 155 | E7 2 205 | E7 2 107 |
E7 3 321 | E7 3 446 | E7 3 215 |
E7 4 381 | E7 4 457 | E7 4 476 |
E7 5 793 | E7 5 932 | E7 5 407 |
E7 6 892 | E7 6 926 | E7 6 389 |
E7 7 406 | E7 7 381 | E7 7 177 |
E8 1 23 | E8 1 27 | E8 1 35 |
E8 2 33 | E8 2 52 | E8 2 27 |
E8 3 99 | E8 3 118 | E8 3 66 |
E8 4 98 | E8 4 113 | E8 4 124 |
E8 5 202 | E8 5 251 | E8 5 107 |
E8 6 329 | E8 6 350 | E8 6 155 |
E8 7 180 | E8 7 173 | E8 7 80 |
E9 1 10 | E9 1 13 | E9 1 13 |
E9 2 10 | E9 2 10 | E9 2 10 |
E9 3 27 | E9 3 32 | E9 3 21 |
E9 4 36 | E9 4 52 | E9 4 58 |
E9 5 70 | E9 5 82 | E9 5 51 |
E9 6 138 | E9 6 156 | E9 6 70 |
E9 7 116 | E9 7 114 | E9 7 41 |
Total 4419 | Total 5016 | Total 2735 |
| | |





B.  PRESCRIBED SEA TOUR EXTENSION DATA 
Navy
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Totals
Master Chief 51 82 122 124 53 10 4 446
Senior Chief 141 294 429 348 118 33 8 1371
Chief 488 798 1079 975 402 178 46 3966
First Class 886 1300 1310 1063 473 189 57 5278
Second Class 1278 2014 1939 924 474 186 70 6885
Third Class 154 404 599 338 86 44 14 1639
Seaman 6 17 29 38 6 6 2 104
Total 3004 4909 5507 3810 1612 646 201 19689  
 
BM
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Master Chief 2 3 3 2 1 11
Senior Chief 2 7 9 9 4 3 34
Chief 17 20 38 34 23 10 3 145
First Class 21 43 41 47 34 11 197
Second Class 60 73 54 39 43 16 2 287
Third Class 3 7 1 5 16
Seaman 1 1
Total 105 154 146 131 110 40 5 691  
 
CTI
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Master Chief 1 1 2 4
Senior Chief 1 1 1 3
Chief 6 1 2 9
First Class 3 6 6 1 16
Second Class 2 1 3
Third Class 1 1
Seaman 0
Total 11 7 10 7 1 0 0 36  
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FC
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Master Chief 3 1 4 8 2 18
Senior Chief 3 3 10 7 1 24
Chief 11 16 30 30 8 4 2 101
First Class 21 33 26 20 9 1 1 111
Second Class 26 50 49 16 12 11 2 166
Third Class 5 9 6 1 1 22
Seaman 0
Total 69 112 125 82 32 17 5 442  
 
MA
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Master Chief 1 2 3
Senior Chief 0
Chief 2 3 6 2 13
First Class 9 11 31 7 58
Second Class 5 9 41 6 61
Third Class 1 1
Seaman 0
Total 17 23 80 16 0 0 0 136  
OS
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Master Chief 1 6 4 2 13
Senior Chief 2 8 13 11 6 40
Chief 4 11 10 5 9 2 41
First Class 17 22 14 16 6 6 81
Second Class 48 67 28 18 10 13 5 189
Third Class 4 1 1 6
Seaman 0
Total 75 110 72 54 33 21 5 370  
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C. END STRENGTH DATA 
Rating
Pay Grade 
Group JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT
BM E1-E3 33 38 37 39 38 40 36 29 27 42 43 48
E4-E6 2329 2345 2325 2224 2264 2232 2243 2123 2131 2113 2145 2062
E7-E9 597 560 574 590 588 573 551 535 535 528 522 547
CTI E1-E3 45 61 42 53 49 48 39 50 37 88 98 123
E4-E6 801 799 810 836 838 879 902 886 886 899 939 957
E7-E9 143 138 135 140 137 136 135 134 130 127 128 134
FC E1-E3 525 911 1166 1083 950 998 865 710 516 471 382 303
E4-E6 1942 2126 2154 2203 2396 2494 2448 2322 2449 2581 2493 2527
E7-E9 658 613 627 678 675 642 645 648 646 645 623 606
MA E1-E3 2 2 5 44 194 339 507 1282 1873 2206 2255 2560
E4-E6 800 868 1002 1071 1156 1289 1476 1719 1983 2369 2970 3390
E7-E9 285 274 278 302 307 309 315 346 354 348 350 414
OS E1-E3 611 414 362 463 443 453 284 319 321 357 362 336
E4-E6 2098 2146 2213 2170 2274 2320 2404 2341 2425 2469 2514 2433
E7-E9 436 421 410 452 446 447 449 449 463 466 453 473
SUBTOTAL 11305 11716 12140 12348 12755 13199 13299 13893 14776 15709 16277 16913
ALL NAVY 155764 153675 157146 162766 160781 159196 160919 159989 158922 157082 158520 160026
Rating
Pay Grade 
Group JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT
BM E1-E3 44 45 48 42 36 44 52 46 54 54 48 74
E4-E6 2003 2003 2019 1953 1900 1845 1759 1697 1605 1556 1513 1356
E7-E9 540 540 541 558 556 544 521 553 537 535 441 450
CTI E1-E3 86 81 33 34 54 111 62 78 55 26 138 73
E4-E6 974 974 1010 978 974 993 995 1009 1041 1067 1047 1014
E7-E9 132 132 124 129 135 134 136 144 140 138 131 150
FC E1-E3 281 281 263 219 242 333 312 392 398 525 594 586
E4-E6 2502 2502 2504 2454 2376 2349 2308 2233 2202 2170 2139 1908
E7-E9 560 560 556 530 547 539 514 532 520 504 497 522
MA E1-E3 2525 2525 2200 1611 1456 1573 1555 1323 1398 1644 1601 1684
E4-E6 4359 4359 4964 5606 5831 5905 6097 6362 6380 6237 6240 5889
E7-E9 430 430 442 545 564 572 594 633 629 631 609 641
OS E1-E3 477 477 357 537 699 538 405 341 314 319 251 333
E4-E6 2399 2399 2501 2440 2376 2291 2203 2158 2136 2134 2125 2007
E7-E9 475 475 481 484 487 482 477 480 466 459 437 445
SUBTOTAL 17787 17783 18043 18120 18233 18253 17990 17981 17875 17999 17811 17132
ALL NAVY 152218 152218 154629 154388 150577 146790 148034 149489 145313 144461 142426 140930







Group JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT
BM E1-E3 115 131 130 108 89 89 76 92 87 127 132 148
E4-E6 2993 2835 2777 2631 2581 2532 2809 2638 2835 2734 2969 2793
E7-E9 573 575 553 602 597 598 606 637 629 623 614 617
CTI E1-E3 5 11 10 8 5 9 6 5 5 5 3 3
E4-E6 309 300 315 322 344 346 367 372 397 417 436 433
E7-E9 36 38 38 45 46 49 48 53 53 57 57 61
FC E1-E3 172 205 191 232 184 178 156 179 156 136 116 118
E4-E6 4514 4538 4646 4680 4787 4851 4976 5013 5027 4923 4932 4640
E7-E9 451 405 387 445 447 462 453 454 448 441 441 489
MA E1-E3 1 1 1 2 12 22 33 108 135 137 160 189
E4-E6 429 414 407 416 444 483 548 580 622 666 717 697
E7-E9 130 126 115 130 133 135 131 141 134 141 151 157
OS E1-E3 1486 1774 1447 1355 1370 1479 1239 1217 1025 1072 1150 1266
E4-E6 3672 3479 3784 3727 3748 3615 3864 3644 3865 3745 4120 3780
E7-E9 363 359 365 392 393 388 379 410 389 389 392 419
SUBTOTAL 15249 15191 15166 15095 15180 15236 15691 15543 15807 15613 16390 15810
ALL NAVY 155759 158367 158411 157940 161272 163901 164974 165362 166208 165558 165166 161805
Rating
Pay Grade 
Group JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT
BM E1-E3 176 176 161 162 175 195 350 296 330 309 260 153
E4-E6 2963 2963 3053 2910 2861 2745 2647 2678 2702 2597 2547 2452
E7-E9 588 588 583 606 590 582 585 608 585 564 489 407
CTI E1-E3 6 6 2 5 2 2 5 4 2 2 2 3
E4-E6 486 486 497 501 509 502 489 445 417 402 383 374
E7-E9 62 62 66 70 63 64 59 59 56 57 51 63
FC E1-E3 141 141 142 132 140 132 124 141 147 128 145 202
E4-E6 4408 4408 4202 3894 3821 3716 3540 3314 3229 3186 3028 2874
E7-E9 503 503 494 542 513 507 502 537 535 520 496 576
MA E1-E3 119 119 133 135 153 168 162 121 142 172 209 225
E4-E6 769 769 874 890 951 958 1010 1050 1101 1161 1216 1234
E7-E9 160 160 165 183 186 187 183 190 190 173 172 184
OS E1-E3 1366 1366 1022 1077 1275 1509 1525 1116 1071 1143 971 819
E4-E6 3855 3855 4195 3886 3728 3606 3526 3701 3689 3538 3629 3560
E7-E9 416 416 407 427 418 413 390 435 433 418 402 430
SUBTOTAL 16018 16018 15996 15420 15385 15286 15097 14695 14629 14370 14000 13556
ALL NAVY 166215 166215 163234 160339 161102 160584 157778 154549 155830 154092 152020 150629







Group JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT
BM E1-E3 77.70% 77.51% 77.84% 73.47% 70.08% 68.99% 67.86% 76.03% 76.32% 75.15% 75.43% 75.51%
E4-E6 56.24% 54.73% 54.43% 54.19% 53.27% 53.15% 55.60% 55.41% 57.09% 56.41% 58.06% 57.53%
E7-E9 48.97% 50.66% 49.07% 50.50% 50.38% 51.07% 52.38% 54.35% 54.04% 54.13% 54.05% 53.01%
CTI E1-E3 10.00% 15.28% 19.23% 13.11% 9.26% 15.79% 13.33% 9.09% 11.90% 5.38% 2.97% 2.38%
E4-E6 27.84% 27.30% 28.00% 27.81% 29.10% 28.24% 28.92% 29.57% 30.94% 31.69% 31.71% 31.15%
E7-E9 20.11% 21.59% 21.97% 24.32% 25.14% 26.49% 26.23% 28.34% 28.96% 30.98% 30.81% 31.28%
FC E1-E3 24.68% 18.37% 14.08% 17.64% 16.23% 15.14% 15.28% 20.13% 23.21% 22.41% 23.29% 28.03%
E4-E6 69.92% 68.10% 68.32% 67.99% 66.64% 66.04% 67.03% 68.34% 67.24% 65.61% 66.42% 64.74%
E7-E9 40.67% 39.78% 38.17% 39.63% 39.84% 41.85% 41.26% 41.20% 40.95% 40.61% 41.45% 44.66%
MA E1-E3 33.33% 33.33% 16.67% 4.35% 5.83% 6.09% 6.11% 7.77% 6.72% 5.85% 6.63% 6.88%
E4-E6 34.91% 32.29% 28.89% 27.98% 27.75% 27.26% 27.08% 25.23% 23.88% 21.94% 19.45% 17.05%
E7-E9 31.33% 31.50% 29.26% 30.09% 30.23% 30.41% 29.37% 28.95% 27.46% 28.83% 30.14% 27.50%
OS E1-E3 70.86% 81.08% 79.99% 74.53% 75.57% 76.55% 81.35% 79.23% 76.15% 75.02% 76.06% 79.03%
E4-E6 63.64% 61.85% 63.10% 63.20% 62.24% 60.91% 61.65% 60.89% 61.45% 60.27% 62.10% 60.84%
E7-E9 45.43% 46.03% 47.10% 46.45% 46.84% 46.47% 45.77% 47.73% 45.66% 45.50% 46.39% 46.97%
SUBTOTAL 57.43% 56.46% 55.54% 55.00% 54.34% 53.58% 54.13% 52.80% 51.69% 49.85% 50.17% 48.31%
ALL NAVY 50.00% 50.75% 50.20% 49.25% 50.08% 50.73% 50.62% 50.83% 51.12% 51.31% 51.03% 50.28%
Rating
Pay Grade 
Group JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT
BM E1-E3 80.00% 79.64% 77.03% 79.41% 82.94% 81.59% 87.06% 86.55% 85.94% 85.12% 84.42% 67.40%
E4-E6 59.67% 59.67% 60.19% 59.84% 60.09% 59.80% 60.08% 61.21% 62.74% 62.53% 62.73% 64.39%
E7-E9 52.13% 52.13% 51.87% 52.06% 51.48% 51.69% 52.89% 52.37% 52.14% 51.32% 52.58% 47.49%
CTI E1-E3 6.52% 6.90% 5.71% 12.82% 3.57% 1.77% 7.46% 4.88% 3.51% 7.14% 1.43% 3.95%
E4-E6 33.29% 33.29% 32.98% 33.87% 34.32% 33.58% 32.95% 30.61% 28.60% 27.37% 26.78% 26.95%
E7-E9 31.96% 31.96% 34.74% 35.18% 31.82% 32.32% 30.26% 29.06% 28.57% 29.23% 28.02% 29.58%
FC E1-E3 33.41% 33.41% 35.06% 37.61% 36.65% 28.39% 28.44% 26.45% 26.97% 19.60% 19.62% 25.63%
E4-E6 63.79% 63.79% 62.66% 61.34% 61.66% 61.27% 60.53% 59.74% 59.45% 59.48% 58.60% 60.10%
E7-E9 47.32% 47.32% 47.05% 50.56% 48.40% 48.47% 49.41% 50.23% 50.71% 50.78% 49.95% 52.46%
MA E1-E3 4.50% 4.50% 5.70% 7.73% 9.51% 9.65% 9.44% 8.38% 9.22% 9.47% 11.55% 11.79%
E4-E6 15.00% 15.00% 14.97% 13.70% 14.02% 13.96% 14.21% 14.17% 14.72% 15.69% 16.31% 17.32%
E7-E9 27.12% 27.12% 27.18% 25.14% 24.80% 24.64% 23.55% 23.09% 23.20% 21.52% 22.02% 22.30%
OS E1-E3 74.12% 74.12% 74.11% 66.73% 64.59% 73.72% 79.02% 76.60% 77.33% 78.18% 79.46% 71.09%
E4-E6 61.64% 61.64% 62.65% 61.43% 61.07% 61.15% 61.55% 63.17% 63.33% 62.38% 63.07% 63.95%
E7-E9 46.69% 46.69% 45.83% 46.87% 46.19% 46.15% 44.98% 47.54% 48.16% 47.66% 47.91% 49.14%
SUBTOTAL 47.38% 47.39% 46.99% 45.97% 45.76% 45.58% 45.63% 44.97% 45.01% 44.39% 44.01% 44.17%
ALL NAVY 52.20% 52.20% 51.35% 50.95% 51.69% 52.24% 51.59% 50.83% 51.75% 51.61% 51.63% 51.66%
2004 2005 2006
Percentage at Sea 

































Oct-00 6658 235 5706 104 584 7445 255 184 3537 107 3.53% 44.26% 8.77% 43.66% 2.76% 58.15%
Apr-01 6513 201 4788 71 653 8175 303 207 4859 115 3.09% 35.32% 10.03% 46.40% 3.18% 55.56%
Oct-01 6207 157 3825 71 1036 12104 361 199 4954 102 2.53% 45.22% 16.69% 34.85% 3.21% 51.26%
Apr-02 6081 173 4218 60 526 6746 228 175 3924 106 2.84% 34.68% 8.65% 43.35% 2.88% 60.57%
Oct-02 6067 203 5007 87 572 6924 239 144 3099 83 3.35% 42.86% 9.43% 41.78% 2.37% 57.64%
Apr-03 6177 243 6129 92 668 8694 289 188 4514 96 3.93% 37.86% 10.81% 43.26% 3.04% 51.06%
Oct-03 6222 211 5310 85 668 5699 240 155 3309 77 3.39% 40.28% 10.74% 35.93% 2.49% 49.68%
Apr-04 6321 238 6003 72 692 9744 272 189 4063 100 3.77% 30.25% 10.95% 39.31% 2.99% 52.91%
Oct-04 6213 276 6975 115 606 8084 223 179 3774 90 4.44% 41.67% 9.75% 36.80% 2.88% 50.28%
Apr-05 5955 240 6171 108 504 6656 157 360 8204 202 4.03% 45.00% 8.46% 31.15% 6.05% 56.11%
Oct-05 5878 273 6957 111 493 6528 156 323 8279 157 4.64% 40.66% 8.39% 31.64% 5.50% 48.61%
Apr-06 5615 219 5394 99 457 5756 139 213 5171 106 3.90% 45.21% 8.14% 30.42% 3.79% 49.77%
ALL BM





























Oct-00 1333 3 108 1 39 426 9 36 1404 12 0.23% 33.33% 2.93% 23.08% 2.70% 33.33%
Apr-01 1340 13 396 4 35 364 3 23 716 8 0.97% 30.77% 2.61% 8.57% 1.72% 34.78%
Oct-01 1404 8 198 4 144 2372 22 34 1040 12 0.57% 50.00% 10.26% 15.28% 2.42% 35.29%
Apr-02 1467 6 198 4 36 430 16 18 759 6 0.41% 66.67% 2.45% 44.44% 1.23% 33.33%
Oct-02 1500 69 2412 4 20 262 12 24 970 8 4.60% 5.80% 1.33% 60.00% 1.60% 33.33%
Apr-03 1593 10 342 4 42 467 15 26 1023 11 0.63% 40.00% 2.64% 35.71% 1.63% 42.31%
Oct-03 1711 18 630 7 145 164 14 18 735 5 1.05% 38.89% 8.47% 9.66% 1.05% 27.78%
Apr-04 1741 17 558 9 172 3235 11 25 1131 9 0.98% 52.94% 9.88% 6.40% 1.44% 36.00%
Oct-04 1717 44 1494 15 197 3491 10 20 856 9 2.56% 34.09% 11.47% 5.08% 1.16% 45.00%
Apr-05 1806 15 540 5 171 2870 13 27 1157 6 0.83% 33.33% 9.47% 7.60% 1.50% 22.22%
Oct-05 1739 17 558 6 128 2084 13 28 1299 7 0.98% 35.29% 7.36% 10.16% 1.61% 25.00%
Apr-06 1693 24 756 5 98 1355 13 30 1219 9 1.42% 20.83% 5.79% 13.27% 1.77% 30.00%
ALL CTI






























Oct-00 8219 234 6145.5 47 370 4433 72 363 10839 87 2.85% 20.09% 4.50% 19.46% 4.42% 23.97%
Apr-01 8830 143 3750 34 436 5738 80 507 16024 108 1.62% 23.78% 4.94% 18.35% 5.74% 21.30%
Oct-01 9351 140 3652.5 28 2276 45595 141 470 13506 126 1.50% 20.00% 24.34% 6.20% 5.03% 26.81%
Apr-02 9660 140 3336.75 44 297 3874 131 288 6871.5 79 1.45% 31.43% 3.07% 44.11% 2.98% 27.43%
Oct-02 9360 276 6573.75 85 352 4822 142 308 7744 77 2.95% 30.80% 3.76% 40.34% 3.29% 25.00%
Apr-03 9227 272 6678 73 304 2955 130 101 1954.5 42 2.95% 26.84% 3.29% 42.76% 1.09% 41.58%
Oct-03 8703 162 3943.5 61 1965 2045 45 73 1613.5 26 1.86% 37.65% 22.58% 2.29% 0.84% 35.62%
Apr-04 8412 277 6810 74 1443 30798 55 115 3149.5 30 3.29% 26.71% 17.15% 3.81% 1.37% 26.09%
Oct-04 7782 179 4400.25 57 1226 25696 76 103 2639 27 2.30% 31.84% 15.75% 6.20% 1.32% 26.21%
Apr-05 7566 261 6427.5 84 888 17796 63 325 7821 107 3.45% 32.18% 11.74% 7.09% 4.30% 32.92%
Oct-05 7149 119 2833.5 49 859 17050 69 273 5969 105 1.66% 41.18% 12.02% 8.03% 3.82% 38.46%
Apr-06 7033 153 3708 62 808 16090 74 300 7658 127 2.18% 40.52% 11.49% 9.16% 4.27% 42.33%
ALL FC





























Oct-00 1642 29 648 8 68 772 16 49 1290 19 1.77% 27.59% 4.14% 23.53% 2.98% 38.78%
Apr-01 1688 11 228 2 49 600 12 38 1225 6 0.65% 18.18% 2.90% 24.49% 2.25% 15.79%
Oct-01 1965 19 429 5 119 1249 15 40 985 13 0.97% 26.32% 6.06% 12.61% 2.04% 32.50%
Apr-02 2579 30 600 2 74 807 16 34 733 9 1.16% 6.67% 2.87% 21.62% 1.32% 26.47%
Oct-02 4178 17 327 1 68 794 15 40 808 11 0.41% 5.88% 1.63% 22.06% 0.96% 27.50%
Apr-03 5869 18 369 2 65 738 14 46 886 15 0.31% 11.11% 1.11% 21.54% 0.78% 32.61%
Oct-03 7411 27 630 2 197 607 12 78 2010 17 0.36% 7.41% 2.66% 6.09% 1.05% 21.79%
Apr-04 8364 13 258 4 207 2541 14 60 1427 14 0.16% 30.77% 2.47% 6.76% 0.72% 23.33%
Oct-04 8971 33 735 8 299 3578 32 55 1254 20 0.37% 24.24% 3.33% 10.70% 0.61% 36.36%
Apr-05 9363 29 633 4 353 4456 43 82 1864 25 0.31% 13.79% 3.77% 12.18% 0.88% 30.49%
Oct-05 9679 33 741 5 346 4292 28 83 1548 38 0.34% 15.15% 3.57% 8.09% 0.86% 45.78%
Apr-06 10019 24 528 8 321 3957 21 65 1817 12 0.24% 33.33% 3.20% 6.54% 0.65% 18.46%































Oct-00 8522 268 7203 85 315 2981 125 317 7907 183 3.14% 31.72% 3.70% 39.68% 3.72% 57.73%
Apr-01 8683 216 5940 52 313 2845 134 285 8132 155 2.49% 24.07% 3.60% 42.81% 3.28% 54.39%
Oct-01 8596 219 5880 79 1122 11847 276 325 8488 184 2.55% 36.07% 13.05% 24.60% 3.78% 56.62%
Apr-02 8751 268 7320 91 435 4106 196 283 7353 162 3.06% 33.96% 4.97% 45.06% 3.23% 57.24%
Oct-02 8421 226 6072 74 376 3914 165 299 7743 179 2.68% 32.74% 4.47% 43.88% 3.55% 59.87%
Apr-03 8534 319 8727 115 445 4358 205 326 8411 196 3.74% 36.05% 5.21% 46.07% 3.82% 60.12%
Oct-03 8735 242 6531 102 859 2222 203 229 5792 133 2.77% 42.15% 9.83% 23.63% 2.62% 58.08%
Apr-04 9010 259 7131 92 924 10561 194 386 10359 219 2.87% 35.52% 10.26% 21.00% 4.28% 56.74%
Oct-04 8863 295 8094 97 896 10224 148 306 8240 151 3.33% 32.88% 10.11% 16.52% 3.45% 49.35%
Apr-05 8839 293 8010 88 1101 12354 144 382 10527 193 3.31% 30.03% 12.46% 13.08% 4.32% 50.52%
Oct-05 8232 220 5913 61 1205 13535 94 311 8927 131 2.67% 27.73% 14.64% 7.80% 3.78% 42.12%
Apr-06 8013 208 5613 61 1243 14207 152 199 5720 86 2.60% 29.33% 15.51% 12.23% 2.48% 43.22%





E.  COST DATA 
1. Career Sea Pay and Career Sea Pay Premium Costs 
All Navy 
 











Five Ratings of Interest 
 
 
Fiscal Year Rating BM FC OS CTI MA
2002* 9,195,113 17,527,108 15,219,931 40,393 1,124,708
2003* 9,727,417 17,824,535 14,121,200 47,010 1,664,998
2004* 9,549,166 15,124,305 13,824,724 51,325 1,819,343
2005 8,685,057 12,299,531 13,185,807 50,213 2,038,075
2006 6,932,088 11,069,195 11,595,545 44,068 1,782,274
* Estimate
Fiscal Year Rating BM FC OS CTI MA
2002* 601,239 1,620,423 1,338,839 0 25,921
2003* 679,687 1,760,996 1,327,423 0 41,006
2004* 742,945 1,663,778 1,447,018 0 49,892
2005 722,233 1,446,178 1,475,154 0 59,738
2006 467,326 1,367,748 1,138,393 0 46,823
* Estimate
Career Sea Pay Cost ($2006)



















Year Rate Number of SRB's
Dollar Amount 
($CY)


































OS 623 $3,170,074  
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3. Advancement Data 
CYCLE 174 






























Duties 2 & 
4
BMC 354 70 317 77 19 1 55 11 29 6 19.774% 24.290% 19.154% 23.656%
CTIC 137 12 50 9 2 1 11 0 28 4 8.759% 18.000% 10.180% 14.754%
FCC 358 74 271 61 4 0 35 11 15 1 20.670% 22.509% 19.894% 23.529%
MAC 161 28 103 32 34 9 18 7 53 14 17.391% 31.068% 20.565% 32.231%
OSC 285 60 306 91 7 2 41 12 26 4 21.053% 29.739% 20.755% 29.683%
Advancement RateType Duty 6Type Duty 1 Type Duty 2 Type Duty 3 Type Duty 4
 
CYCLE 175 






























Duties 2 & 
4
BM1 588 65 559 72 45 3 86 8 43 5 11.054% 12.880% 10.799% 12.403%
BM2 262 136 469 221 24 12 88 40 23 12 51.908% 47.122% 51.780% 46.858%
BM3 44 44 368 364 3 3 81 80 1 1 100.000% 98.913% 100.000% 98.886%
CTI1 74 23 37 11 4 0 4 2 18 6 31.081% 29.730% 30.208% 31.707%
CTI2 181 23 65 5 6 2 18 2 43 5 12.707% 7.692% 13.043% 8.434%
CTI3 9 8 4 4 88.889% 100.000% 88.889% 100.000%
FC1 261 89 215 75 2 0 26 10 8 4 34.100% 34.884% 34.317% 35.270%
FC2 452 17 1715 129 5 0 247 21 5 0 3.761% 7.522% 3.680% 7.645%
FC3 6 6 40 39 4 4 100.000% 97.500% 100.000% 97.727%
MA1 134 59 62 29 42 15 13 5 68 32 44.030% 46.774% 43.443% 45.333%
MA2 77 71 34 30 38 38 7 7 32 31 92.208% 88.235% 95.238% 90.244%
MA3 38 38 30 30 17 17 52 52 100.000% 100.000% 100.000% 100.000%
OS1 645 110 476 114 18 2 75 16 58 6 17.054% 23.950% 16.366% 23.593%
OS2 95 86 496 469 5 3 93 80 16 13 90.526% 94.556% 87.931% 93.209%
OS3 89 87 415 410 2 2 74 73 6 6 97.753% 98.795% 97.938% 98.773%


































Duties 2 & 
4
BM1 515 84 503 88 50 10 91 15 41 7 16.311% 17.495% 16.667% 17.340%
BM2 204 91 526 197 22 12 101 34 22 8 44.608% 37.452% 44.758% 36.842%
BM3 72 72 480 478 1 1 95 95 3 3 100.000% 99.583% 100.000% 99.652%
CTI1 93 37 31 11 4 3 4 1 19 8 39.785% 35.484% 41.379% 34.286%
CTI2 214 46 86 21 5 0 22 5 43 10 21.495% 24.419% 21.374% 24.074%
CTI3 5 5 1 1 3 3 100.000% 100.000% 100.000% 100.000%
FC1 266 81 236 95 4 1 32 10 11 0 30.451% 40.254% 29.181% 39.179%
FC2 386 19 2056 214 5 0 304 36 6 1 4.922% 10.409% 5.038% 10.593%
FC3 2 2 38 28 2 1 100.000% 73.684% 100.000% 72.500%
MA1 232 133 82 53 47 29 13 8 93 60 57.328% 64.634% 59.677% 64.211%
MA2 91 90 28 28 27 27 3 3 50 50 98.901% 100.000% 99.405% 100.000%
MA3 196 196 33 33 64 64 3 3 81 81 100.000% 100.000% 100.000% 100.000%
OS1 709 95 444 101 18 1 57 6 64 12 13.399% 22.748% 13.654% 21.357%
OS2 92 88 494 486 7 7 106 101 10 10 95.652% 98.381% 96.330% 97.833%
OS3 116 112 679 661 2 2 124 121 15 13 96.552% 97.349% 95.489% 97.385%
Type Duty 1 Type Duty 2 Type Duty 3 Advancement RateType Duty 4 Type Duty 6
 
CYCLE 178 






























Duties 2 & 
4
BMC 261 58 281 88 15 4 58 20 27 4 22.222% 31.317% 21.782% 31.858%
CTIC 136 14 54 7 3 0 6 1 34 3 10.294% 12.963% 9.827% 13.333%
FCC 421 77 322 63 6 1 43 9 15 2 18.290% 19.565% 18.100% 19.726%
MAC 236 58 125 32 33 9 22 7 90 21 24.576% 25.600% 24.513% 26.531%
OSC 313 55 346 81 6 0 48 16 35 6 17.572% 23.410% 17.232% 24.619%


































Duties 2 & 
4
BM1 410 50 414 83 39 7 83 16 32 6 12.195% 20.048% 13.098% 19.920%
BM2 176 53 541 195 14 6 117 44 17 5 30.114% 36.044% 30.918% 36.322%
BM3 66 64 461 452 87 85 4 4 96.970% 98.048% 97.143% 97.993%
CTI1 85 23 26 12 2 0 4 1 16 5 27.059% 46.154% 27.184% 43.333%
CTI2 235 45 92 17 5 1 19 11 46 13 19.149% 18.478% 20.629% 25.225%
CTI3 7 7 100.000% 100.000%
FC1 390 52 225 34 7 1 31 8 15 2 13.333% 15.111% 13.350% 16.406%
FC2 466 9 2142 120 11 1 315 17 9 1 1.931% 5.602% 2.263% 5.576%
FC3 3 0 27 4 7 1 0.000% 14.815% 0.000% 14.706%
MA1 234 125 73 40 58 26 16 10 95 42 53.419% 54.795% 49.871% 56.180%
MA2 114 69 52 38 35 29 1 1 79 46 60.526% 73.077% 63.158% 73.585%
MA3 324 324 49 49 62 62 2 2 123 123 100.000% 100.000% 100.000% 100.000%
OS1 695 27 428 41 25 2 69 7 56 6 3.885% 9.579% 4.510% 9.658%
OS2 91 41 400 248 8 5 69 40 8 3 45.055% 62.000% 45.794% 61.407%
OS3 101 21 537 197 2 1 146 47 9 1 20.792% 36.685% 20.536% 35.725%


































Duties 2 & 
4
BM1 417 101 378 105 26 4 72 22 37 10 24.221% 27.778% 23.958% 28.222%
BM2 213 64 606 239 14 9 112 41 20 8 30.047% 39.439% 32.794% 38.997%
BM3 107 33 833 369 2 0 170 71 5 0 30.841% 44.298% 28.947% 43.868%
CTI1 81 26 28 12 3 1 4 1 19 9 32.099% 42.857% 34.951% 40.625%
CTI2 245 48 101 32 3 0 11 5 44 18 19.592% 31.683% 22.603% 33.036%
CTI3 4 4 1 1 100.000% 100.000% 100.000% 100.000%
FC1 541 130 274 86 13 6 51 19 20 4 24.030% 31.387% 24.390% 32.308%
FC2 370 16 2242 123 5 0 322 13 8 0 4.324% 5.486% 4.178% 5.304%
FC3 2 0 38 4 5 1 0.000% 10.526% 0.000% 11.628%
MA1 300 48 80 9 59 6 15 5 127 16 16.000% 11.250% 14.403% 14.737%
MA2 347 178 66 35 82 50 9 3 144 64 51.297% 53.030% 50.960% 50.667%
MA3 416 316 43 33 62 51 3 2 204 146 75.962% 76.744% 75.220% 76.087%
OS1 715 138 464 123 22 5 74 25 70 12 19.301% 26.509% 19.207% 27.509%
OS2 120 60 776 546 7 2 105 73 17 10 50.000% 70.361% 50.000% 70.261%
OS3 149 113 822 704 2 1 156 126 12 7 75.839% 85.645% 74.233% 84.867%



































Duties 2 & 
4
BMC 247 38 280 91 18 2 37 8 23 1 15.385% 32.500% 14.236% 31.230%
CTIC 136 25 47 10 3 0 24 4 18.382% 21.277% 18.125% 20.000%
FCC 445 64 342 52 8 1 50 12 14 1 14.382% 15.205% 14.133% 16.327%
MAC 438 131 160 52 62 12 29 6 127 31 29.909% 32.500% 27.751% 30.688%
OSC 364 42 375 53 8 0 46 7 24 0 11.538% 14.133% 10.606% 14.252%


































Duties 2 & 
4
BM1 361 7 316 20 21 0 49 2 25 0 1.939% 6.329% 1.720% 6.027%
BM2 201 19 704 70 22 1 116 8 9 1 9.453% 9.943% 9.052% 9.512%
BM3 136 22 841 177 7 1 141 34 2 0 16.176% 21.046% 15.862% 21.487%
CTI1 72 29 27 10 6 1 5 2 14 6 40.278% 37.037% 39.130% 37.500%
CTI2 278 35 95 11 1 0 11 2 36 6 12.590% 11.579% 13.016% 12.264%
CTI3 7 7 1 1 100.000% 100.000%
FC1 579 89 217 45 6 0 26 2 21 2 15.371% 20.737% 15.017% 19.342%
FC2 303 25 2129 154 26 3 305 11 7 2 8.251% 7.233% 8.929% 6.779%
FC3 2 1 55 22 6 4 50.000% 40.000% 50.000% 42.623%
MA1 409 238 101 63 86 45 18 11 165 100 58.191% 62.376% 58.030% 62.185%
MA2 637 589 97 94 93 90 22 22 213 206 92.465% 96.907% 93.849% 97.479%
MA3 472 471 28 28 91 91 20 20 291 291 99.788% 100.000% 99.883% 100.000%
OS1 647 17 429 9 15 0 64 1 55 0 2.628% 2.098% 2.371% 2.028%
OS2 100 1 460 15 4 0 58 2 6 0 1.000% 3.261% 0.909% 3.282%
OS3 156 2 558 14 3 0 102 1 5 0 1.282% 2.509% 1.220% 2.273%


































Duties 2 & 
4
BM1 419 51 489 56 20 3 57 10 21 3 12.172% 11.452% 12.391% 12.088%
BM2 195 15 782 74 17 0 147 15 10 2 7.692% 9.463% 7.658% 9.580%
BM3 155 1 1082 30 7 0 216 3 3 0 0.645% 2.773% 0.606% 2.542%
CTI1 72 32 33 11 4 2 2 0 13 6 44.444% 33.333% 44.944% 31.429%
CTI2 323 51 107 25 2 0 9 4 32 7 15.789% 23.364% 16.246% 25.000%
CTI3 1 0 0.000% 0.000%
FC1 746 53 330 24 10 2 45 5 26 1 7.105% 7.273% 7.161% 7.733%
FC2 225 13 1839 146 23 0 269 22 7 0 5.778% 7.939% 5.098% 7.970%
FC3 3 2 54 29 5 2 66.667% 53.704% 66.667% 52.542%
MA1 411 62 92 20 69 8 11 1 111 13 15.085% 21.739% 14.044% 20.388%
MA2 545 14 56 0 103 2 7 0 175 3 2.569% 0.000% 2.309% 0.000%
MA3 339 161 40 20 122 59 15 6 221 90 47.493% 50.000% 45.455% 47.273%
OS1 784 12 528 20 19 0 72 1 63 1 1.531% 3.788% 1.501% 3.500%
OS2 193 37 990 267 6 2 156 32 8 3 19.171% 26.970% 20.290% 26.091%
OS3 171 19 707 137 9 0 112 19 8 1 11.111% 19.378% 10.638% 19.048%


































Duties 2 & 
4
BMC 270 73 304 87 20 3 34 16 21 2 27.037% 28.618% 25.080% 30.473%
CTIC 145 18 56 9 1 1 31 5 12.414% 16.071% 13.559% 16.071%
FCC 426 96 397 88 7 2 45 10 16 1 22.535% 22.166% 22.049% 22.172%
MAC 578 42 188 31 72 11 38 5 133 14 7.266% 16.489% 8.557% 15.929%
OSC 415 62 464 96 13 1 57 12 26 2 14.940% 20.690% 14.317% 20.729%


































Duties 2 & 
4
BM1 456 10 417 11 34 1 58 1 25 0 2.193% 2.638% 2.136% 2.526%
BM2 182 11 779 74 17 1 130 16 7 0 6.044% 9.499% 5.825% 9.901%
BM3 111 31 889 378 5 0 169 67 3 0 27.928% 42.520% 26.050% 42.060%
CTI1 52 39 23 20 3 2 1 1 11 11 75.000% 86.957% 78.788% 87.500%
CTI2 355 152 91 51 2 1 5 4 21 14 42.817% 56.044% 44.180% 57.292%
CTI3 2 2 100.000% 100.000%
FC1 771 76 292 40 7 1 45 6 24 3 9.857% 13.699% 9.975% 13.650%
FC2 188 14 1713 130 20 1 233 22 1 0 7.447% 7.589% 7.177% 7.811%
FC3 3 1 42 16 6 3 33.333% 38.095% 33.333% 39.583%
MA1 500 70 109 20 98 14 9 3 150 38 14.000% 18.349% 16.310% 19.492%
MA2 1055 223 130 42 183 53 38 9 438 93 21.137% 32.308% 22.017% 30.357%
MA3 358 267 65 47 127 96 26 19 385 238 74.581% 72.308% 69.080% 72.527%
OS1 849 41 583 56 31 1 85 5 61 4 4.829% 9.605% 4.888% 9.132%
OS2 127 56 702 436 9 4 97 75 6 2 44.094% 62.108% 43.662% 63.955%
OS3 128 125 638 632 6 6 98 97 7 7 97.656% 99.060% 97.872% 99.049%


































Duties 2 & 
4
BM1 487 33 518 47 17 0 74 6 32 1 6.776% 9.073% 6.343% 8.953%
BM2 186 37 579 120 8 0 99 25 11 4 19.892% 20.725% 20.000% 21.386%
BM3 59 4 990 129 4 1 168 19 4 0 6.780% 13.030% 7.463% 12.781%
CTI1 43 42 22 21 1 1 4 4 9 9 97.674% 95.455% 98.113% 96.154%
CTI2 283 215 33 30 1 0 5 5 75.972% 90.909% 76.125% 90.909%
CTI3 3 3 100.000% 100.000%
FC1 752 86 262 44 2 0 45 10 26 1 11.436% 16.794% 11.154% 17.590%
FC2 142 24 1444 211 8 0 178 26 2 0 16.901% 14.612% 15.789% 14.612%
FC3 6 5 30 21 3 1 83.333% 70.000% 83.333% 66.667%
MA1 596 44 123 13 123 7 16 0 187 21 7.383% 10.569% 7.947% 9.353%
MA2 997 141 153 41 155 21 39 5 412 77 14.142% 26.797% 15.281% 23.958%
MA3 282 195 49 35 73 44 13 10 162 122 69.149% 71.429% 69.826% 72.581%
OS1 814 63 684 66 22 2 89 11 67 3 7.740% 9.649% 7.530% 9.961%
OS2 73 44 331 254 1 1 33 30 9 8 60.274% 76.737% 63.855% 78.022%
OS3 36 15 433 310 1 0 72 61 1 1 41.667% 71.594% 42.105% 73.465%
Type Duty 6 Advancement RateType Duty 1 Type Duty 2 Type Duty 3 Type Duty 4
 
CYCLE 190 






























Duties 2 & 
4
BMC 231 79 347 124 8 2 39 11 20 7 34.199% 35.735% 33.977% 34.974%
CTIC 134 29 81 17 6 1 4 0 13 5 21.642% 20.988% 22.876% 20.000%
FCC 392 86 390 77 3 0 47 9 18 3 21.939% 19.744% 21.550% 19.680%
MAC 647 58 181 16 72 11 30 3 255 18 8.964% 8.840% 8.932% 9.005%
OSC 394 45 490 66 13 2 61 8 27 1 11.421% 13.469% 11.060% 13.430%


































Duties 2 & 
4
BM1 483 86 524 103 18 4 71 14 29 7 17.805% 19.656% 18.302% 19.664%
BM2 158 54 666 226 9 4 127 37 6 2 34.177% 33.934% 34.682% 33.165%
BM3 100 19 1185 317 10 1 239 69 6 1 19.000% 26.751% 18.103% 27.107%
CTI1 32 25 23 19 1 1 4 4 4 4 78.125% 82.609% 81.081% 85.185%
CTI2 162 64 9 3 39.506% 33.333% 39.506% 33.333%
CTI3 2 2 100.000% 100.000%
FC1 659 114 232 46 1 1 34 5 28 0 17.299% 19.828% 16.715% 19.173%
FC2 144 35 1184 281 2 0 160 42 1 0 24.306% 23.733% 23.810% 24.033%
FC3 3 3 18 18 2 2 100.000% 100.000% 100.000% 100.000%
MA1 633 19 168 4 120 3 25 0 213 5 3.002% 2.381% 2.795% 2.073%
MA2 1040 24 251 10 221 4 66 4 522 10 2.308% 3.984% 2.131% 4.416%
MA3 255 42 45 11 57 10 17 6 108 19 16.471% 24.444% 16.905% 27.419%
OS1 767 42 613 35 19 2 93 9 61 3 5.476% 5.710% 5.549% 6.232%
OS2 88 37 621 326 6 4 94 55 8 6 42.045% 52.496% 46.078% 53.287%
OS3 38 38 358 354 2 2 54 53 1 1 100.000% 98.883% 100.000% 98.786%


































Duties 2 & 
4
BM1 457 23 507 43 20 0 55 4 28 3 5.033% 8.481% 5.149% 8.363%
BM2 105 26 490 149 8 4 71 17 13 6 24.762% 30.408% 28.571% 29.590%
BM3 59 13 1001 394 4 2 183 65 2 0 22.034% 39.361% 23.077% 38.767%
CTI1 42 36 25 22 1 1 6 6 2 2 85.714% 88.000% 86.667% 90.323%
CTI2 185 72 4 1 1 0 38.919% 25.000% 38.710% 25.000%
CTI3
FC1 505 105 246 80 40 20 20 10 20.792% 32.520% 21.905% 34.965%
FC2 113 28 963 383 4 3 108 42 6 1 24.779% 39.772% 26.016% 39.683%
FC3 1 1 18 18 100.000% 100.000% 100.000% 100.000%
MA1 729 11 192 2 117 3 40 0 240 12 1.509% 1.042% 2.394% 0.862%
MA2 1069 56 288 19 234 17 80 8 535 28 5.239% 6.597% 5.495% 7.337%
MA3 393 276 63 50 49 34 29 18 157 127 70.229% 79.365% 72.955% 73.913%
OS1 804 29 714 36 23 0 91 4 62 2 3.607% 5.042% 3.487% 4.969%
OS2 63 29 551 306 3 1 82 50 3 0 46.032% 55.535% 43.478% 56.240%
OS3 31 30 342 340 1 1 35 35 1 1 96.774% 99.415% 96.970% 99.469%












4. Advancement Differential Cost Data (in Current Year Dollars) 
Jul-01




Differential $116.70 $117.00 $190.80 $144.63
Probability 0.15 0.475 0.375
Differential $123.30 $124.80 $126.30 $124.95
Probability 0.2 0.5 0.3
Differential $193.50 $190.80 $190.50 $208.80 $211.20 $208.50 $200.19
Probability 0.05 0.15 0.3 0.3 0.15 0.05
Differential $258.30 $264.90 $263.70 $264.00 $263.10 $286.50 $320.70 $268.65
Probability 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.05
Jan-02




Differential $132.30 $131.10 $131.28
Probability 0.15 0.85
Differential $146.10 $148.20 $160.50 $151.47
Probability 0.2 0.5 0.3
Differential $205.20 $204.60 $224.40 $227.10 $224.10 $221.22
Probability 0.05 0.15 0.3 0.3 0.2
Differential $300.00 $308.40 $307.80 $309.00 $308.70 $334.50 $372.30 $313.91


















Differential $137.70 $136.50 $220.50 $295.20 $170.05
Probability 0.15 0.475 0.35 0.025
Differential $152.10 $154.20 $213.00 $171.42
Probability 0.2 0.5 0.3
Differential $213.60 $167.10 $249.00 $240.60 $279.00 $353.40 $242.15
Probability 0.05 0.15 0.3 0.3 0.15 0.05
Differential $312.30 $267.00 $276.00 $276.00 $353.70 $403.20 $429.00 $312.83
Probability 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.05
Jan-04




Differential $142.80 $141.30 $228.60 $174.26
Probability 0.15 0.475 0.375
Differential $174.30 $177.00 $239.10 $195.09
Probability 0.2 0.5 0.3
Differential $227.70 $179.40 $265.20 $256.50 $317.40 $395.40 $262.19
Probability 0.05 0.15 0.3 0.3 0.15 0.05
Differential $332.10 $285.30 $294.90 $294.90 $376.50 $428.70 $485.70 $335.04


















Differential $147.90 $146.10 $236.70 $180.35
Probability 0.15 0.475 0.375
Differential $180.60 $183.00 $247.50 $201.87
Probability 0.2 0.5 0.3
Differential $235.80 $185.70 $274.50 $265.50 $328.50 $409.20 $271.38
Probability 0.05 0.15 0.3 0.3 0.15 0.05
Differential $343.50 $295.20 $305.10 $305.40 $389.70 $444.70 $502.50 $346.87
Probability 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.05
Jan-06




Differential $152.40 $150.60 $243.90 $185.86
Probability 0.15 0.475 0.375
Differential $186.00 $188.70 $255.30 $208.14
Probability 0.2 0.5 0.3
Differential $243.00 $191.40 $282.90 $273.90 $338.70 $422.10 $279.81
Probability 0.05 0.15 0.3 0.3 0.15 0.05
Differential $354.30 $304.50 $314.40 $315.00 $401.70 $457.50 $517.80 $357.53













5. Advancement Cost 
 
Fiscal Year Rating BM FC OS CTI MA
2002 2,577,198 1,150,828 3,823,903 114,804 452,736
2003 3,487,777 1,388,399 4,394,743 173,275 634,397
2004 2,760,980 1,240,933 4,122,225 203,319 708,683
2005 1,516,184 1,188,349 3,063,760 254,888 428,074
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